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.an-
The dissertation seeks to understand lesbi,
feminism as a theory addressing the needs of lesbians for
a positive identity and sense of community. it locates
this development within the larger context of the prob-
lems facing liberalism in the late twentieth century, in
particular the issues surrounding the social construction
of the self. The criticisms of modern society made by
lesbian-feminists are largely the same as those made by
male and heterosexual female communitarian opponents of
liberalism, though their understandings of their projects
often diverge.
Early chapters examine the problems of liberalism,
first in the recent literature of political theory, then
rise
in the specific context of the treatment of lesbians.
Liberalism is seen to hide or minimize loci of social
conflict in a way that, ironically, denies dignity to
those it seeks to help. chapter Three examines the
of lesbian-feminism as a response to this 'poverty of
liberalism' and finds that lesbian-feminism fails to pro-
vide a ground for genuine autonomy and dignity, instead
offering the lesbian an insular community that is defined
in terms strikingly similar to those used by opponents of
homosexual practices and identity. Chapter Four treats
the issue of sadomasochism as a result of the peculiar
configurations of power and sexuality engendered by
lesbian-feminism, considering the argument as both a lo-
gical development of these configurations and as evidence
of their problematic nature.
The final chapter concludes that the failure of
lesbian-feminism to develop a theory that remedies the
problems of liberalism without engendering a totalist,
narcissistic community is in fact due to the nature of
the modern self, a self that is peculiarly trained for
and suited to the liberal ideal of self-control and re-
sponsible choice. This self cannot be simply disposed
of, but must be accounted for in the further development
vi
of liberalise In a direction that does justice to the
reality of community and social life while nonetheless
acknowledging the dignity of a self that transcends
social construction.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
Why would a poXitical theorist write about lesbian-
femin ism? Is there even £uch a tMng ^ lesbian _ feminism
to be addressed? if there* U „v a4.nere 1S
'
what does it have to do
with political theory?
Political theories premise themselves upon concep-
tions of human nature and the self. These conceptions
carry recommendations for the construction of society and
Polity. The premises do not concern simply the questions
we traditionally label 'political' - questions involving
obligation, order, and justice. They also bear on the
issues at the heart of all social relations - problems of
language, of sexuality, of difference.
In the current era, these issues have emerged at the
forefront of political theory. This emergence is at
least partially due to the breakdown of the liberal
separation between society and politics which is itself
so characteristically modern. The challenges to
liberalism have relied heavily upon the recognition of
the ways in which our political relations are shaped by
our social and economic conditions and expectations, and
this recognition has served in turn to structure our
1
ideas of how a more human, more W « h/ '"or just, order would look
LeSbian-femlniS
™' " 3 th-y of the oppression and
nature of lesMans and women
, ls one of these vlsions
Seeing the limits of liberalism , s^ ^
lesbian-feminists have sought to explain those limits and
to offer an alternative oonception of proper human rela-
tions. This conception is a species of the family 0f
theories that is loosely labelled communitarian'
. The
hallmark of communitariani sm is, first, the recognition
that humans are not ontologically isolated - that they
are
' social animals'
,
zooi politikoi, by their nature
bound together through language and culture; and second,
the appeal to a return to, or erection of, a political
order that does justice to this recognition by fostering
and enriching the ties between us. These theories are
neither 'conservative' or 'radical' in nature, unless
they are both - united in their rejection of the limited
liberal state. For writers such as Alisdair Maclntyre
and Michael Oakeshott, the communitarian stance serves to
criticize the poverty of tradition and order in
modernity. For those such as Karl Marx, it provides the
wedge with which to pry open the locked doors of
capitalism and expose the tyranny behind neutrality.
A prime example of the problematic status of
communitarianism is
.ean-aacques Rousseau. Seemingiy
radrcal in his critique of the society around him, an
inspiration for the French Revolution, he _
^
Edmund Burxe as the author of wanton destruction.
However, this radical loudly protested the growing
license and equality of women in society, earning himself
the hatred of feminists and the title of reactionary. Is
there a contradiction? Perhaps to the liberal, with her
particular understanding of equality and freedom, but not
to Rousseau. Amidst the complexities of his thought we
see a coherence. This coherence rests on the under-
standing that political life does not exist in a vacuum,
that political community requires social cohesion of a
sort that capitalism erodes. His conception of the just
political order is inseparable from his vision of the
moral family and its 'natural' order.
Is this inseparability a fluke, a flaw unique to
Rousseau? Or is it a consequence of the nature of com-
munitarian thought itself, a danger to be addressed by
any critic of liberalism? Communitarians on all points
of the political spectrum have had to face charges that
they in fact ignore the rights and freedoms of some in
order to ensure those of others, or that they reject
fundamental liberties in the quest fn ^i-ne or those overlooked
by Uberal the °rists
- «- mandate arises from
Co., tradition, or the general wiU( the ^^^^ ^
looms before the communitarian is
, what do „e do^
those who d0 not fit into God's order, who defy
tradition, who reject or obstruct the will of the peoplg ,
in short, the problem is: how do we deal with difference?
Lesbians in the twentieth century are a group
defined by difference fro, an aSsumed norm . The history
of their attempts to understand their difference is a
classic example of the problems facing all societies
today. Lesbi an-feminism is one attempt at explaining and
supporting this difference; as such it provides us with a
'case study', if you will, 0 f the strengths and
weaknesses of communitarian thinking in the twentieth
century
.
If it can be said that there is one primary
influence behind this dissertation, the influence must be
that of Michel Foucault. I have fought with Foucault (in
several senses) for years; this battle will surely
continue. His work has been called anarchist by some,
latently reformist by others; I will not, cannot assess
those charges here
. „hat r wm suggest ^ ^ ^
P-vided us wlth . new set o£ questiQns ^ ^ a ^
Perspective on power and language and action that is
sorely needed if Wp sr-owe a e to progress in our thinking about
community and liberty. in maklnfI ^y. ing these questions my own,
I Perhaps use Foucault for purposes he would not
sanction. However, the range of appropriation and
recognition of one's work by a diverse group is surely an
inciter of the power of one's thought, as well as being
out of one's hands
. „ x have tamed^ he ^
certainly energized and radicaiized me; what higher
tribute can a teacher receive?
I do believe that the years ahead will see a
growing body of work on the connection between Foucault
and the great stream of Protestant Enlightenment thought,
as well as the French liberal tradition. It is my aim in
the work at hand to reclaim the Augustinian impulse that
gives rise to liberalism while pruning the modern
branches of positivism and privatization. These growths
give rise to theories that acknowledge what they neglect;
my hope is that we might find some vision that can do
justice to all the needs (if not all the wants) of humans
and their home.
CHAPTER ONE
LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS
Philosophy; its hi „ V 3 PUbUcjusticePon the c« needs^^e^ the0ry ° fthe incompatible claims that can be fTT^''an appeal to the interests n/^K °""ded on(the only basis of « ^ f the "dividual
acknowledges)
- the^dericie^ llberalis™
dS2 or co^tinVS^Lt^^??"-- «-
...the crucial moral opposition is between
eth ! ,
lfferenCes) extend beyond
human
morallty to the understanding of
social ^
10n/ S
°
that rival conceptions of thesciences, of their limits and
an^ 5
iSS
'
Sre intimately bound up with theantagonistic confrontation of these twoalternative ways of viewing the human world.
2
Is the contest of modernity that between Aristotle
and the liberals? Why hasn't the liberal order
collapsed? And why does Alasdair Maclntyre, in After
Virtue
'
introduce Nietzsche, the renowned critic of
liberalism, as the worthy - the only - opponent of
Aristotle?
For Americans, the conflict between those with
agendas for the good life, the good society, and those
who oppose any such public program is a basic struggle of
P°litioal Ufe
- tu. struggle has had
VariSd f°rmS
— - * *-— engenders sorae
tyrannies even as it aispiaces others; free speech isboth liberating and threatening, to individuals and t„
societies. In the iate twentieth century, iiberalism
appears as an incoherent, alienating k •
'
il l , boring doctrine; at
its best a compromise position at- it-*v i>.u:ion, t its worst a mask for
the raany faces of power. It is this evaluafcion ^
leads Maclntyre to counterpose Aristotle and Nietzsche.
He beiieves, as do many, that iiberalism in any form is
rationally indefensible and that therefore the only
alternatives are a return to Aristotelian ethics and an
open irrationalism, the triumph of will over reason:
••there is no third alternative and moreparticularly there is no alternative providedby those thinkers at the heart of the contemp-orary conventional curriculum in moral
P
philosophy, Hume, Kant and Mill. it is no
wonder that the teaching of ethics is so oftendestructive and sceptical in its effects uponthe minds of those taught . 3 P
°
To Macmtyre, the choice is clear. Between a return
to some pre-modern morality and a world of "arbitrary
order and nihilistic resistance''^, his vote is for pre-
modern visions. But how are we to construct such a
8»°rality
, given our modern sceptlcism? ^ it
for us now to construct an ethics and pontics
simultaneously meaningful and non-oppressive?
Before we embark on an answer to this, we must
satisfy ourselves that the situation is as dire as the
critics of liberalism have painted it t« , •„F L a l
-
Is liberalism in
fact the defective, dangerous doctrine that it may seem,
in the Anglo-American world, liberalism is still a very
viable philosophy, both academically and culturally.
Lest we think that we have seen its burial, Anthony
Arblaster reminds us that
fLrcr
d
vitaf,
Ctr
,
in
?-
C°Uld attraCt the oftie ce, tal hostility which liberalism oft- Pn
ToiTl fdLdT^ C °mplete -ach^oniLta ly ead doctrines - those with no
significant hold over people's minds - do notattract that type of hostility.
. the re-sumption must be, therefore, that liberalism is
?ending?5
Ugh t0 be WOrth attacking, or de
What must be discovered is no longer the defects of
liberalism, but the source of its tenacity in a world
that seems to cry for more than liberalism can possibly
offer. The strength of liberalism is clearly not due
solely to the force of liberal arguments; in its
9clearest, analytical form liberal i.ml s seems an impossible
basis for social relations, just or unjust.
Individualism
The core of liberalism's problem has been its
metaphysical basis in an individualism that isolates us
from one another, both as objects for analysis and as
subjects engaged in social intercourse. In explaining
the connection between ontological and ethical indivi-
dualism, Arblaster says that the effect of seeing the
individual as more 'real' than society is to lend a
higher moral status to the individual simply because she
is an individual. This reinforces the atomistic
conception of society that is behind liberalism.
Meaning at its simplest no more than 'the
single human being', there is almost invariably
an additional weight of emphasis on the aspectof singleness, on what separates ordistinguishes one person from another, ratherthan on what one person has in common with his
or her fellow human beings.
. . it tends
therefore to impute a high degree of complete-
ness and self-sufficiency to the single humanbeing, with the implication that separateness,
autonomy is the fundamental, metaphysical human
condition. b
10
coincidence of cosmic and individual moo 1 eanmgs and values,
broke down under the forrs nfn ce of emp lre. The retrieval of
Aristotle in medieval Christianity was essential!, an
attempt to return to this orderly cosmos and its
appreciation of the social nature of personality. The
breakdown of medieval Christianity resulted in the
collapse of that cosmos and its teleology. Conceptions
°f the good that had earlier been treated as natural or
God-given were revealed as excuses for violence and
domination
.
Within this shifting world, the liberal project was
not a rejection of meaning, but rather an attempt to
relocate it in a place whose reality could not be denied.
This place was the individual. Whether through religion
or philosophy, through Luther' s conscience or Descartes'
cogito, the individual was accorded ontological primacy.
Of course, the ease and comfort with which this is
achieved depends upon how one conceives that individual,
and especially upon the conception and evaluation of
human reason. For the Enlightenment, reason was both
universally accessible and singularly directive; that is,
the lack of a God whose revelation was a clear and
11
may
reuable source of public policy did ^ ^ ^ ^
Possibility of what Michael Sandel has referred to as
"subjects capable of constituting meaning on thei r own -
as agents of construction in the case of the right, as
agents of choice in the case of the good. "7 0nce
unshackled from prejudice and tradition, huma„ reason
be counted upon to find its way to ceri-ain •LO ta universal
principles of justice.
However, reason cannot provide a principle of the
good
-
of a proper telos for humans - without violating
that which the deontological liberal sees as the essence
of humanness
- the capacity for autonomous choice. The
essential distinction between liberalism and other
doctrines is its focus on the will rather than reason as
the decisive feature in human life and dignity. The fact
that 'construction of the right' and 'choice of the good'
can be separated is indicative of this. The liberal has
a teleology, but that teleology is rooted in the will -
the capacity for moral choice. 8 Because of this
difference, non-liberals can easily see liberalism as a
doctrine bereft of ends or standards. Liberals
themselves have seen their project as antiteleological,
because it is opposed to organic or rationalist schemas
12
society. However, thls is . misunderstandlng
_ ^
' COnCIete
'
rSality
°
f «- ^vidual and her dcsires is
ontologicall, and ethicaXlv prior t0 any construction Qf
the g0 od ; however, thls reallty^ ^ ^
the focus on choice so characteristic of Protestants
and its progeny.
Utilitarian versus Deontological Liberal ism
This primacy of the individual led liberals in two
directions, depending on their epistemological foun-
dations. For the later British empiricists, the only
ethics compatible with liberalism was utilitarianism,
which hoped to eliminate the seeming arbitrariness of
social teleologies by direct appeals to individual
happiness. The rationalist heritage of the European
continent, however, remained tied to a notion of humanity
based, not on desire, but on reason and will. while the
utilitarian ethic possesses the rationalist virtue of
consistency in its attempt to avoid evaluations of
desires, it cannot provide a commitment to justice that
prevails over public opinion.
13
ion
I» contrast, Kantian l iberalism attempfcs fcQ^
the primacy of justicg in ethics
^ ^ prwide a
for individual determination of the ends of iife
Michael sandel explains this: .. though it ( Kantianism]
rejects the possibility of an objective moral order, this
liberalism does not- b^in •t hold that D ust anything goes. it
affirms justice, not nihilism. The notion of a universe
empty of intrinsic meaning does not, on the deontological
view, imply a world wholly ungoverned by regulative
principles"*. The problem then becomes obvious: it is
"to find a standpoint neither compromised by its
implication in the world nor dissociated and so
disqualified by detachment . "10 The Kantian needs to
provide an account of justice that does not become an
account of the good while simultaneously remaining above
the relativity and multiplicity of particular
preferences. The public realm is the realm of freedom,
but in a distinctly non-Aristotelian sense. Charles
Taylor describes Kant's conception of the point of
politics as "the regulation of external freedom, in a way
consonant with morality, and therefore inner freedom.
Not that political structures can hope to realize this
latter. That is quite ruled out... since law can never
14
direct stives, and „e must never try
. ^ ^
organize external freedom in Keeping with the basic
beings
.
"H
While this is not the place for a full exposition of
Kant's liberalism, some points are in order. The basic
Premise of moral thinking for Kant is that "human beings
are rational agents. As such, what they must be accorded
above all is the respect of being treated as ends and not
just as means.
. . but to respect a being as an
originator of ends is above all to respect his freedom of
action. "12 The withdrawal of God from the public world
does not, for Kant, eliminate meaning. Rather, it frees
us to recognize the essential dignity of humans. The
fundamental fact in a disenchanted world is the capacity
of the human to originate ends, to choose and to act.
Any politics that obscures this by reliance on a
substantive concept of the good is ipso facto a violation
of human dignity.
This charge tells against utilitarianism as well as
against any Aristotelian doctrine. To prioritize
happiness is to sneak in a telos, however loosely formed.
15
If our goal is to resoect th» r
originators of ends then
fr
f
ed°™ of
which we can restrict t T ly ground on
agent in our attemot\l t eed°m ° f one su<*
harmonize it tith the
"fconcrliation is to
Piness cannot £\ Sustm^ ° f °therS ' HaP"
restriction. No n L f ™-° f SUChbecause to overrule hi, haPP^oss can be,
of those of soLone
6
e e°^t to ^
^•to^IcTS^2 --"he 11" -
would be to Xter^LXr^ln^afhis1^happiness consists. This won! ri \Z
agent. 13
tUS as a free rational
While happiness may be the goal of each individual
(or it may not), to a Kantian liberal it has no more
priority in political debate than does any other
individual choice. The individual capacity for choice
remains the fundamental value, the unacknowledged telos
of liberalism. This telos demands that each be left to
decide for herself what her desires and ends are.
While Kant's liberalism appears at first as a
fortress for individual dignity and freedom, it has
suffered the fate of most distinctively modern political
theory. m attempting to eliminate the grip of tyranny,
liberals of all persuasions find themselves losing also
their grasp on community and on morality. The immediate
16
consequence of ontological individualism is t0
problematic social relations - thus the eternal
recurrence of contract theory in liberal thought. Con-
tract theory serves both to provide a description of
social relations and to ground arguments for particular
forms of those relations.
In the most powerful contemporary presentation of
contract theory, John Rawls has argued that we must
distinguish between persons as private beings with
"attachments and loves that they believe they would not,
or could not, stand apart from", who cannot imagine
themselves apart from "certain religious and philo-
sophical convictions and commitments"", and as pubUc
agents whose sense of self has no grounding in particular
social matrices. However, Michael Sandel argues
convincingly that "the deontological conception of the
self cannot admit the distinction required. Allowing
constitutive possibilities where 'private' ends are at
stake would seem unavoidably to allow at least the
possibility that 'public' ends could be constitutive as
well. Once the bounds of the self are no longer fixed,
individuated in advance and given prior to experience,
there is no saying in principle what sorts of experiences
17
could shape or reshape them/ ^ guarantee ^
'Private' and never
-public events cQuld conceivabiy ^
decisive . "15
The liberal wh0 cannot adm . t Qf a ^^^^
constituted self may retreat- i-„reat to utilitarianism, hoping to
conceptualize human relations along abstract but
inclusive lines. Charles Taylor explains:
lofoffhf UitarlaniSm haVS for it. Aot f t ings undoubtedly: its seeminacompatibility with scientific though"9 itsthis-worldly humanist focus it, ™
Tni^fT ? S th6Se WGre understood in theintellectual culture nourished by the eli-stemological revolution of the seventeenth
s™Y fromd J?? SCientifC — P-tly
an ethi^!
litar ' an PersPective, one validatedhical position by hard evidence. Youcount the consequences for human happiness of
with
0
^^^^
C °UrSe
'
and y °U 3o wi?h the onethe highest favourable total. What countsas human happiness was thought to be something
conceptually unproblemat ic, a scientifically
establishable domain of facts like others One
could abandon all the metaphysical or
theological factors - commands of God, natural
rights, virtues - which made ethical questions
scientifically undecidable. Bluntly, we could
calculate
.
16
18
However, as mentioned before, this choice is not
available. To the extent ^ we^
theory, we agree t0 conceive of one another as potential
-ans to happiness. Whiie this has the attraction of a
certain pessimistic realism about it, it has not been
possible to reconcile this vision with the demand for
individual autonomy and respect. And so the liberal is
stuck, as Arblaster points out:
to libera! i„S™dufusm?
f^ ^
Yet at the same time there is another strandwithin liberalism which asserts and reassertsthat the individual is naturally egoistic andtherefore tends, as Wolff has rightly pSiitSout, to treat other individuals not as enSsbut as means to his or her own ends. 0 fcourse it is possible to resolve this'
'
contradiction by jettisoning one or other of
5™ ^ ^ le^ents - But an individualism or ego-ism which abandons the principles of equal
rights and respect for the human person i scertainly no longer liberal. While on theother hand the abandonment of psychological
egoism requires a reconstruction of the theory
of the personality and human motivation whichliberalism has never undertaken. So the
contradiction remains. 17
What exactly does Arblaster mean when he says that
liberalism requires a 'reconstruction of the theory of
the personality and human motivation'? in the effort to
19
avoid substantive teleology, ^ ^^
to abstract itself from any conceptions of human nature
or psychology, lest it sneak in ideas of tbe proper ends
or conduct of Ufe. The demand for dignity and rights ^
taken to be completei y independent of the particular
character of the individual - in fact Hh." t , liberalism as a
political doctrine cannot allow it«i f „ii sel any concern with
individual character. However, this avoidance is pos-
sible only at the price of incoherence and irrelevance.
Any attempt to justify individual rights must be based on
some notion of what it is in us that commands respect.
And this notion in turn must act as a prescription, an
injunction upon us to build our lives and our society in
such a way as to foster and develop those features. 18
Attempts to avoid this logic of rights by making some
abstract idea, such as the capacity for rational choice,
the basis of rights cannot reflect any concrete
connection with actual policies and choices in political
life. That such a liberalism is only incidentally
liberating is evident in Kant's acceptance of the need
for total obedience to the state on the part of the
individual, even when the state is oppressive. The
Kantian freedom to choose becomes immediately either the
20
freedom of the Stoic or that of the libertine - a
retrieval of inner di gnity amidst t yranny , or a denial of
any responsibility within society. Kant falls off the
Stoic precipice, and when he tries to scramble back over
the edge, his grip is repulsed by
it is who says out loud what so many were (and are)
thinking, but afraid to sav t-w v,u ay. hat humanism is nihilism,
that liberalism is a doomed attempt at fh, eLL t e survival of
meaning.
The Endurance of Liberali sm
In his attack on Kant, Nietzsche provides us with a
perspective on liberalism that has since become
ubiquitous
:
inferior in his psychology and knowledge ofhuman nature; way off when it comes to greathistorical values... a dogmatist through andthrough, but ponderously sick of this inclin-
ation, to such an extent that he wished totyrannize it, but also weary right away of
skepticism.
. .a delayer and a mediator. 19
In this statement we can find the charges that today
are levelled at liberalism: its faulty ontological,
epistemological and psychological foundations; its
21
abstraction and ahistoricity; its ambiguity and lack Qf
inspiring force. Libera lism is indeed the^
theory of scepticism, but it is a ^ - •t: scepticism which is
continual referring to ideals ^ , most ^
surely the strangest sort of thinking to be seen.
This strange thought has, however, an enduring
appeal to moderns. Ita appeal springs<
, ^
the fundamental dilemma of modernity - the sense that
something has been lost, coupled with the fear of getting
it back, our alienation
- from ourselves, from one
another, from God - is real and painful. The i iberal
sees clearly, however, that this alienation cannot just
be transcended or eliminated by the re-constitution of
society. Once sundered from a source of intrinsic
meaning, humans can only pretend to return to unity and
purpose by suppressing and oppressing that which is not
part of the scheme. The 'glassy essence' of reason and
truth is produced at the expense of constructions of the
Other that lie in wait beyond the borders. The liberal
focus on choice is an attempt to retain the awareness
that beyond Otherness is humanity - that the patient is
still an agent, the homosexual a citizen, the prisoner a
22
human being
"
and that thi
*—ity lays claim t0 sorae
sort of acknowledgement.
Thus we see that Maclntyre's conclusion, though
perhaps accurate logically speaking, i s fundamentally
mislead.ng. It may be true fchat for modernity ^
lies between some sort of Ari ^t-nt-^iistoteliamsm and something
else. But to see Nietzsche as the final representative
of that 'something else' is to concede the nihilism that
he recognized as a constant threat for Western
Philosophy. Nietzsche and Aristotle would be united in
their disdain for liberalism, and on surpris i ngly similar
grounds. Liberalism asks us to behave ,•,c n as if we agreed on
ends, but only short of the point where we betray
ourselves; and it hopes that the point of betrayal is
beyond the points of necessary social intercourse.
To the totalist, the metaphysician, whether
teleological or psychological, this is a naive hope; to
the liberal, on the other hand, it must be the constant
focus of concern. Hence the liberal is forced to sift
and re-sift, weigh and reweigh, explain and justify again
and again. in this, she angers those who demans a
complete and logical answer, as well as those who want to
be done with deliberation. To those who are, in Mill's
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words,
"destitute of faith and terrified , vof skepticism",
the liberal lives in bad faith or fai« ol lse consciousness;
-luctant to make final choices
, she ^ ^ ^
to the need to reassert community and order, thus failing
to give these issues their due.
The truth is that the liberal agenda t , simply
Afferent than the non-iiherai, however often the two may
meet. On this agenda, the top is always reserved for
individual rights and choice; or rather, the individual's
rights are prior to any issue on the agenda, high or low.
And this reservation would annoy Nietzsche just as much
as it would Aristotle. This reservation is indicative of
the location of meaning for the liberal, and it suggests
that this meaning is just as real to her as the good
life, God, or the will to power is to another. It may be
incoherent, as Taylor suggests. It may be used to mask
the flow and absorption of power, as Foucault
demonstrated. Yet it is meaning nonetheless.
The Limits of Liberalism: Oppression and Identity
If liberalism is not premised on the destruction of
meaning, however, it is surely reflective of the loss of
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some shared values and goals m *° . its ontological form,
liberalism functions as a met a-th 0„eory, an argument about
what we should include in political discourse which
becomes explicit in its attempt to draw a line between
Public and private matters. The importance of this line
is peculiar to liberalism, and it opens it to attack from
disintegration of morality and tradition, of shared
understandings, as the r^nit-un esult of public neutrality; on
the other are those who perceive the D i a» nff bc n pl y of power, the
"eight of established concepts and discourses within a
context that denies them. Sheldon Wolin puts the
problem thus:
11 7vZ
Qre t0 ima^ine two intelligent readers
tLf fh S 'r aCh SqUally diStant from him inime, t e first representing the middle of thefifteenth century, the other the middle of thenineteenth, we would naturally expect each tomake radically different criticisms on somepoints, but we might be less prepared to findthem agreeing on others. Our fifteenth-century
reader would be shocked by Hobbes' sardonic
treatment of religion and the ruthless way hedivested political philosophy of all traces of
religious thought and feeling. The nineteenth-
century man, surveying Hobbes from the vantage
point of Marx and the classical economists,
would pronounce him utterly lacking in any
understanding of the influence of economic
factors upon politics. Both criticisms would
25
achievedYp^YlitTYY H °bbeS had
off religionist s
C
tL e^^LS-
310^ 1 "5
of economics. 20 remaining innocent
Since Hobbes first wrote, writers have examined one
or the other side of this conundrum. Today, however,
these two diverse criticisms are increasingly being bound
together, most prominently in the wor K of WoUn, Strauss,
Connolly and Maclntyre21. The modern^ Qf ^
power rush to fill the gap left by the absence of
traditional norms, and the forms of modernity are the
varying compromises and conquests effected between these
two. unable to restore historically spontaneous unity,
moderns attempt its imitation through denial of disunity
or the scientific explanation and destruction of
diversity. However, denial cannot do the job; for those
upon whom unity is pressed are irrevocably aware of their
fundamental divisions.
It is for this reason that much current study is
focussed on groups and issues not long ago thought of as
peripheral to politics. Thus, thought some of the issues
brought up by racial and ethnic minorities, gays and
lesbians, and women have not been readily addressable by
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conse-
~ s both for the politicai strategies Qf ^
and for our related understanding of polltics and ^
Political. The liberal bases pQiiticai a^
hopes on a clear demarcation between the political and
social, the public and the private. The experiences
of minorities in the last thirty years have illustrated
the shortcomings of such theoretical demarcation. In
particular, the struggles of sexual minorities have
revealed and made problematic the connections between
public policy and morality, political theory and onto-
logy. The arguments in these struggles center directly
around the nature of the human self. Every theoretical
and social construction provides some answer to the
questions: can we say in what humanness consists? If so,
in what does it consist? What are the responsibilities
of actors
- public and private, individual and corporate
-
given this standard? What sort of society is required
in order for this humanity to manifest itself?
Liberal individualism parts with other theories when
it posits the capacity for judgment and choice as the
central feature of humanity. Its insistence that we
cannot
- dare not - say anything definitve about
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—ess ieaves both an opening for individual
definition and a Mac, hole for publ ic vacation,
community and mutual responsibility. The Hegelian^
against this void is being manifested today in the
construction of new sociai ontoiogies and teieoiogies
which attest to provide a stronger ground for the seif
The awareness that something is missing in modern liberal
societies has combined with the perception of injustice
and pain to produce a plethora of critiques and visions
for fulfillment.
The centerpiece of these critiques is the category
of oppression. Oppression is a word with many contexts
and shades, and it is precisely this ambiguity that gives
it its power. To the political theorist, oppression
consists in "the systematically unjust exercise of
authority or power over a person or group of persons". 22
However, in other usages oppression refers, not primarily
to the actions of others, but to the psychic condition of
the individual. To be oppressed in this sense is to be
shaped by oppression, to be stunted by the weight of the
burden placed on one's shoulders. This burden does not
always result from state action. it issues, rather, from
the entire social matrix of which politics is but a part.
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m this br0ad sense, oppression involves the denial of
one's own voice through the impos ition of an external,
alien standard for the interpretation and judgraent of
one's thought, action and being.
The problems and issues involved in the category of
oppression are manifold. When does another's opinion
impose on me? what sort of power must be involved to
make this imposition oppressive? How are we to correct
this situation: is it a matter for political action, or a
matter for education and social discussion? Are there
perhaps many places to deal with aspects of the problem?
In large measure, the attractiveness of the notion
of oppression is due to its ambiguity. This flexibility
allows for a much more personal analysis than that
allowed in liberal theory. Liberalism's historic and
philosophical tie to positivism has resulted in its
dismissal by those whose feelings of being oppressed
cannot be located in consensually and systematically
verifiable injustice, and whose claims have been rejected
on that basis.
Lesbians are one group among many that perceive and
protest such felt oppression. Clearly their sense of
oppression is not operative solely at the level of laws,
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** i. derlved everywhere from a cuifcure ^^^^
heterosexuality as the biologlcal
, psycholQgical ^
or- standa rd
. Lesblans are silenced by laws defining
their sexual hehavior as criminal; they
hiding on the job
, in housing, in custody ^
elsewhere; they are ignored by tax and ^
These issues and others are inore asingly comraon topios
for legislation and debate within the U.S., in a way
reminiscent of the civil rlghts battles Qf blacks ^
women
.
Also reminiscent of these struggles is the further
awareness of many lesbians that their problems go beyond
laws and public policy to the core of social structure -
to language and the construction of self. Beginning with
the realization that self-respect, an essential
ingredient of happiness, has been denied them by virtue
of definitions and perceptions of lesbianism and
homosexuality, lesbians began the fight for an identity
that would lend itself to self-respect and pride. in
this process, attitudes and choices have emerged that are
characteristic of much American political argument, and
the failure to date to produce a satisfying theory and
program for lesbian action is reflective of the failure
of modern Dolit-iVai , •P l^cal thrnking to return us to a safe home
« the world. The struggle between the desire tor a
secure social teleology and tne awareness of the price t .
>e Paid for such security is be ing played out within ^
lesbran community (communities?)
, as it is, over and
over, within the American polity as a whole.
It would be a Mistake, however, to assume that
nothing has changed. In a perceptive^^ &
Goldwin has noted that Americans are a people given to
moral thinking about public issues, so that we can be
enlisted in causes not directly our own, and sometimes
even in opposition to personal interest, if we are given
a convincingly principled argument. 23 This is indeed the
case for minorities and women, who made ready use of the
American belief in equality and opportunity. The case is
not so simple for gays and lesbians, however. m this
instance, heterosexuals are being asked for a number of
things. First, minimally, they are being asked to
tolerate a group which is distinguished, not by obviously
inherited traits, such as race or sex, but by behaviors,
and moreover by behaviors which are widely believed to be
immoral or pathological in the Judeo - Christian
tradition. The claim really goes beyond this, however.
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What is asked is not iust t-w uD that homosexuals be left alone
ignored by law; it is that society at large reorient its
understandings and opinions nf h„P o homosexuality, abandoning
its traditional distaste and distrust. The awareness of
the psychological experience of oppression leads to a
remand that the social context of such experiences be
removed
.
Such conflicts are nothing new in Western history
Every change in attitude, in culture, in Ze^ist is ef-
fected at least in part by conscious struggles for
specific rights and privileges. However, the self-
conscious use of political metaphor and imagery in an
area that liberalism has ordinarily reserved for private
life has led to the adoption of strategies and arguments
that seem to transform the topic seriously, even,
perhaps, dangerously.
What do I mean by 'political metaphor and imagery'?
I am referring to the reconception of traditionally
'private' issues in terms of power rather than under-
standing. The phrase 'the personal is political' marks
the rejection of any simple division of realms, seeking
to deny the distinction between private and public
motivations, interests and contests and to expose the
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some
Play of power in persona! and social regions. At
Points the power is visible ^ direc^ ^ ^ t^
•Wlity Of a psychiatris t to commit
. lesMan ^ ^^
institution against her will. At others it-uun , is on the
level of gossip and harassment. The most ,'ntin intriguing and
COmPSlling P°Wer
'
h™
<
is ^at whrch operates within
discourses and languages to structure and organize our
Perceptions, thoughts and judgments. Such a power is
particularly insidious because it is so hard to see.
Once seen, it becomes the most obnoxious, because it is
so immediate and invasive. The most revolutionary work
in lesbian-feminism has been focussed on these points of
Power: in psychiatry and psychology, in heterosexism in
language, in the visual language of pornography. This
work has been based on and has contributed to theory and
Philosophy in diverse areas - Foucault's analyses of the
diverse and minute loci of power, phenomenological and
hermeneutical discussions of the constitution of self and
language, and critical theory have all fed and been
developed by the analysis of the status of lesbians and
gay men.
As with oppression, we must note carefully the
import of this 'political' understanding of society. A
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-ior effect has been the critique and ^ ^
authority beyond individual conscience< ^ be^se
Particular authority have proved abuslve or^ ^because the concept of authority has lost lts legitimacy
If the world as presently constituted admits of no
legitime authority (and in a world where authority ls
solely a mask of power, the notion of legitimaCy van-
ishes,
,
then either a new world must be built or we must
accept the fact of power and become adept at its
management. At present, both responses are being at-
tempted
- sometimes simultaneously, and by the same
person
These responses are made at different levels. One
is the level of vocabulary and logic - of explanation,
definition and justification of one's actions and one's
being. The struggle of lesbians and gay men has provided
us with a clear example of the connections between
explanation and justification. it is a philosophical
commonplace that "the attribution of virtue or vice to a
person because of a certain activity or practice involves
some reference to the agent's state of mind; and his
state of mind is in turn affected by his own view of the
causes influencing and forming his state of mind." 24
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Rar6ly
'
h°WeVer
' « We to such a castration
of the politics of explanation^^ that afforded ^ ^the experience of gays and lesbians. In coming to see
that the psychiatric establishment was conceptually
incapable of understanding their lives as they did, les-
bians became acutely aware of the need of »na all groups and
all individuals for acrP« i-„ »~i *cess to self-understandings that
allow dignity and self-respect.
The response to this awareness is reflective of
another level of the struggle for a secure space in the
world. The phenomenon of a group attemptlng a
conscious definition, explanation and history is funda-
mentally a product of the Enlightenment. The rationalist
belief that humans can construct an ideal society finds
one more expression in this instance. This is
particularly a temptation for Americans. Nothing could
be more natural for Americans than to believe themselves
capable of re-discovering and re-mapping their world.
With this, there is the belief that this can - indeed,
must
- be done without the benefit of earlier thinkers.
This is especially tempting for lesbian-feminists, since
most earlier recorded thinkers were male heterosexuals.
This re-enactment of the Cartesian drama often leads to
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~t. as the orlginal
, wifch fche
new rationalists engendering their own ^
as Rousseau bred his Sade
. Later chapters ^^
within the lesbian community.
This process of definition is part of a larger
attempt to found a community capable of grounding
individual identity. Just as the attempt at explanation
must be performed self-consciously as never before, so
too the construction and maintenance of a community in
this Manner is a radical development. The implication of
any community is order of one sort or other, and so this
attempt to found community is simultaneously the erection
of a new order. This order sometimes clashes with the
prior commitments and understandings of its members, and
thereby introduces questions about the connections
between morality and identity. What is it to be a
lesbian? What is it to be a feminist? what is it to be a
lesbian-feminist? Is there a feminist ethics that is
separate and distinct from other ethics? What does a
self-defined community do with those who claim membership
while violating certain mores - and particularly those
who deny that their behavior is in fact a violation?
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What exactiy is at stake in the definition of
"ities, ThSSe
°« fro™ the partlcular
concerns of iesbians to the generai ground of political
theo ry
, and the struggles of lesMans ^ ^ ^ gri^
with these issues are ilinstrative of the bind that
m°dernS
» is ** ^Pe that this history of
lesbian-feminism will aid us aU .„ understand . ng ^
dilemmas and resiiience of liberaiism and the problems tQ
be confronted by those who seek to dispense with it.
lr
an-
CHAPTER TWO
MEDICAL DISCOURSE AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM
One of the perennial problems for political and
social theory is how sufferers can be so blind to the
suffering when it is so clear to theorists. The expl
ation always involves some contrast between an essential,
possible self and the* arh^ia e ctual, incidental one, whether the
lines be drawn on the basis of ethics, politics,
religion, or medicine. Plato imagined us huddled in the
cave of ignorance; Marx referred to the fetishism and
reification that constitute the alienation of capitalism;
Freud explained our repression and avoidance of reality.
The solution always lies in bringing the real self to the
surface of consciousness and letting it speak and act
rather then accede to the false, limited self. To this
extent every ethicist, every revolutionary, every
psychotherapist is a teacher, a guide to the true way.
They are each carriers of the power that flows through
their discourses, the grammar that marks off right from
wrong, oppression from liberation, sickness from health.
They are united in their task of enlightenment and
ordering, but in fundamentally differing ways. The means
at their disposal, the locus of action, and the criterion
of success vary from language to language.
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Medical Discourse
in modernity, the moral philosopher is at a disad-
vantage. The peculiarity of our era lies in its par-
ticular adaptation of the diohotomy between truth and
falsehood. The scientific world-view locates truth in
facts, in correct apprehension and perception of an
actual, external world. In this system, 'facts' are
separated from 'values'; facts are events, conditions
capable of repetition and verification through experi-
mental procedure, while values are shifting, with their
origin seemingly within the individual. The atomist
conception of the individual discussed in Chapter One
results in a conception of individual consciousness as a
'black box', only accidentally connected to the world
around it. This conception gives rise to an under-
standing of values and emotions as something unamenable
to public, rational dispute. The positivist split
between the inner and outer person, between belief and
behavior, leads to a division between the realm of
values, murky and deep, and that of facts, perhaps hidden
but always potentially available. To such a mind, truth
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and falsehood are not categories for va!Ues, out sole ly
for faots. Truth beoo.es not a property of things, or
acts, hut of judgments and propositions. in this view,
falsehood is reduced to an incorrect judgment or mistaken
Preposition. The power of truth as aietheia, that which
is dis-concealed, and of falsehood as the shadow that
covers ultimate reality, is lost To
-
a scientist, to say
that something is not what it is - „hat ^ v,x w it has manifested
itself to be
- is to speak nonsense, what something ' is '
is revealed through careful, verifiable examination. The
hole of positivism
- the question of the origin of
hypotheses, categories, descriptions that structure
examination
- is unseen. The other side of the
positivist's concern for facts is a remarkable obtuseness
and inability to deal critically with questions that
suggest that the world of 'fact' is socially constructed.
The consequence of the hegemony of the scientific
view is that the philosopher must either be willing to be
located with the other 'metaphysical' disciplines - the
vestiges of medievalism - or she must find a way to
translate her ethics into a more reputable discourse.
Over the last several centuries, there have arisen two
candiates for such assimilation: politics and medicine.
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Politics opens an avenue by pointing t0 oppressionSj fco
unsatisfactory, inhuman conditions; medicine provides a
language of sickness, of malnutrition and defection, of
Perversion. In modernity, politics and medicine are the
two primary sites of social control of the body.
Politics appeals to the dignity of humans and the needs
of the society, while medicine argues about the needs of
the body and the means of its control. Politics speaks,
as Foucualt tells us, of sovereignty and obligation,
rights and duties; it deals straightforwardly with issues
of order and control. Medicine, on the other hand, is
the vehicle for a subtler, more insidious power, the
power of health and of reproduction!. Both discourses
appeal to 'facts', even as they invoke values and ideals;
of health, of justice. Both politics and medicine have
the appeal to grammatically assumed social concern. Such
concern channels and translates the individual's
compassion and desire for a better world, and so serves
to validate the power that flows through both arenas.
Such power, being suspect, must either be justified or it
must be denied - treated as nonexistent or unimportant.
The positivist rejection of metaphysics does not lead
automatically to the revelation and celebration of the
Play of power, but rather to the veiling of power in a
new language. As religion and metaphysics become
suspect, science becomes the new basis for ontology and
teleology
.
in this denial of power, medicine has the advantage.
This is so for two reasons. First, it is intrinsic to
our understanding of politics that it is the realm of
Power
- that is, we define power politically and define
politics in terms of power, whereas medicine enjoys a
status removed from both, sheltering itself under the
umbrella of the sciences. Second, the discipline of the
body that is marshalled by medicine is so immediate, so
particular to us that we cannot readily see it. it is
for this reason that Michel Foucault saw the need to
trace and describe the development of modern medicin e 2.
In discussing the increasing drive toward normalization
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Foucault noted
that "it's medicine which has played the basic role of
the common denominator. its discourse circulated from
one instance to the next. It was in the name of medicine
both that people came to inspect the layout of houses
and, equally, that they classified individuals as insane,
criminal, or sick." 3 In this process, the direct,
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ethically-based reactions fco unaccepfcable behaviQr^
to give way to 'treatment' aimed at eradicating the
siekness, the disease behind the symptoms; iUness became
an ontoiogical category, fining the void left by the
eviction of truth and falsehood from the individual.
This sort of ontoiogical revolution is by no means
unprecedented. Societies all adopt and evolve standards
of humanity, of maturity, of worth; and these standards
all serve as channels of power. Such standards delineate
who may be ignored, who punished, who hidden; they also
designate those who may make the judgments about such
matters. The peculiarity of modern psychology and
psychiatry lies not so much in their maintenance of these
distinctions as in the shape they give them and the
authority given their practitioners. Murray Edelman
points out that "to label a common activity as though it
were a medical one is to establish superior and
subordinate roles, to make it clear who gives orders and
who takes them, and to justify in advance the inhibitions
placed upon the subordinate class." 4
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The Medicalization of Difference
The adoption of this model has been particularly
relevant for those whose behavior faiis into categories
which are always problematic. What was once a simple
-tter of punishment or acceptance has become an invi-
tation to colonization of the mind and body of the
deviant. The medical model has several implications.
First is the perception of problems as individual rather
than social.
wnT^
ng Td,hiS COnstant w°rk with individualsho seem handicapped subtly encourage him toview human unhappiness as a product ofindividual disorder. Even if he is
exceptionally aware of social forces that
contribute to his patient's unhappiness, thePsychiatrist's orientation as a physician tendsto distract him from dealing with such forces.
5
The second aspect of medicalization is its effect
upon popular perceptions of the patient. Halleck
explains
:
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of as indent
' or obvious • "ho' th0Ughtcall him an alcohol^ owever, once we
control his S^.^S^^cj^
and negative consequences. On the one hand"
6
unLi: to
s
°
f
r
rs Fs^pSSiTS';;able contain him impulses q npl' ofhim as an inferior person wh^is ^because he lacks the autonomy and control thatnormal people have. Thus, the community is
in rejecting ^"strict ions upon'him and
to say?6
goring whatever he might try
The most constant and prevalent of these deviances
is homosexuality. Homosexuality enjoys a special status
in modern society, as Thomas Szasz explains:
How much homosexuality is dreaded in our
society is illustrated by the fact that this
condition is considered not only a crime but
also a disease. On the one hand, the homo-
sexual may be treated as a sexual offender,
while, on the other, he may be defined as
mentally ill and subjected to involuntary
"hospitalization" and "treatment". Thus
changing an important moral and social problem
into a medical one has loosed on the homosexual
the sanctions, or the threat of sanction, that
psychiatrists are in a position to exercise
vis-a-vis mental patients. 7
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Homosexuality has this status precisely because of
the iocation of its deviance. Not onl y i s it different>
« is different at a criticai point of social
organization: reproduction of the species. Because of
this location, the pressure brought to bear on homo-
sexuals in Christian society has always been tremendous
Whether the grounds be religious, ethical, political, or
medical, homosexuality has been seen as a threat to
society
.
Within this framework, lesbianism has been a lesser
crime than male homosexuality. This is perhaps due to
the relative impact of each on the reproductive economy;
male homosexuals are abstaining, refusing to participate
in the maintenance of the economy, and this cannot be
overlooked. Lesbians, however, may still become wives
and mothers, whether by choice or by force. At some
times, lesbianism has been less troublesome than
heterosexual adultery, precisely because it has had only
a marginal impact on the reproductive and lineage
systems .
8
Medicine has participated in this discrepancy. It
has been done more by neglect of the topic than by
50
consent; just as lesbians slip through the sodomy
laws of many states, so too do they slip through most
clinical discussions of homosexuality. De i 0res Klaich
century, lesbianism was ignored by Western investi-
gators." However, it soon became a topic of medical
debate and, as such,
lesbianism began to be looked upon (by themedical profession) not as a vice, not as,
b"; tdlS? e --- " WaS 3t this "ime that
and ^ ^ t0 PaSS °Ut of th^ hands of Godthe courts and into the hands of themedical men - where they remain, in one studyor another, to this day. 9 Y
The conceptual consequence of medicalization was a
move from perceptions of lesbians as evil to that of them
as sick, demented, degenerate. This move was usually ac-
companied by pleas for greater tolerance and compassion
on the part of society; doctors and patients have por-
trayed the lesbian as doomed, whether by nature or
childhood, to an unfulfilling, immature existence. This
plea is not only analogous to that made for the insane;
it is a plea for those who are seen to suffer from a
particular insanity, a certain illness. Halleck
describes this:
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professional attitudes toward homosexual
"
behavior have probably not helpeS thehomosexual's plight... To assert that th Bhomosexual is ill helr^ i- n ~t
individual and ^^U^t^^S ^
control his behavior; this has 7rtJ
effect on both parties 2 L detrimental
believes that he is I Z ? homose*ua l whoi«„ 111 feels more driven 3 nH
assume^r^
15
'
the PUblic tossume that at any time he can be overwhelmed
vLwE^^^^^S to
that the homosexual is potentraxiy vio ent^Thus, the psychiatric diagnosis leads to
th«t
rifT S bSin9 PlaCSd on the h°mosexuala may be as severe as those placed on therapist or murderer. 10
The political consequence of this shift in paradigm
was a trend toward medicalizat ion of what had been a
legal problem; however, this movement has never been
completed, as the legal establishment has fought to re-
tain control over an issue which has been within its
purview throughout Judeo-Christian history. what the
legislators and activists can see is the way in which
sexuality as a social issue slips through the cracks of
psychiatric diagnosis and treatment; it is that reality,
too, that accounts for and clarifies issues that the
medical paradigm cannot seem to cope with. To the extent
that issues of sexuality are seen as the province solely
of Psychiatrists and psychologists, they are handled as
matters of health. The fact of the social
-acceptability of homosexuality and lesbianism is made
secondary to the 'disease' or 'character disorder' which
needs explanation and treatment. Further, this
prioritization is no longer open to discussion, for the
linguistic for™ of medicine is that of a truth beyond
politics, beyond compromise or power, speaking from the
truth of nature. In such a form, struggle is useless;
the protester reveals only her own defects, her lack of
understanding and development.
"The person who adopts a
non-middle class norm needs help even if she or he does
not want it", Edelman asserts; in fact, within the
medical/psychological paradigm, this resistance is
evidence of the depth of the sickness.
Health and Freedom: The Liberal Dilemma
It is clear, then, that the psychological language
of health, development and maturity functions in modern-
ity as a teleogical language. As such, it has faced the
same challenges faced by moral language everywhere. The
revolt of modernity is a revolt against a community that
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« too total, too singular for those whose consciousness
i. not in unlson with thafc Qf ma . orit^ ian^
xs that of differentiation, of rights, of privacy
_ ^
liberal is not consoiousl y aiming at the destruction of
moral discourse; rather, she seeks to preserve it by
lifting its scope to what is safe or certain. This is
done by pacing m0rals and teleology behind a door, where
they need not arise in public debate, it is this
closeting of m0ral discourse that challenges liberals
whenever it is seriously questioned by the proponent of
any more sophisticated conception of society.
The arguments of the 1960s and 1970s over the
medical status of homosexuality are replications of the
struggle between liberals and non-liberals in every area.
From the outset, the psychological community concurred in
its judgment that homosexuality, as any deviance, is
pathological. Before Freud, questions were asked about
the 'nature' of the homosexual, and the answer was
primarily that of degeneracy - of genetic, constitutional
deformity and weakness. " The Freudian language of
personality development attempted to remove the stigma
attached to sickness, but the attempt failed; as Philip
Rieff notes, "any arrestment of natural development is
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Freud's basic definition of illness"^. since Freud
expiained homosexuality in terms of arrestment, the
conclusion is clear: homosexuals are sick.
What are the consequences of this conclusion? m
li2m^2^^ Mark
Freedman lists "the implications of the "sickness-
metaphor in relation to homosexuality-
all homosexuality has the same uniform etio-logy or causal basis; homosexuality has adefinite
"prognosis"; homosexuality can andshould be "cured"; and homosexual behaviofisundesirable and to be avoided - like a com-municable disease. 13
Various writers have suggested that 'the homosexual'
is a creation of the medical gaze, a 'type' with a
sexuality, 'homosexuality', which is uniform and
deformed. They further suggest that we have allowed the
homosexual's sexual object choice to dominate and control
our imagery of gay life and have let this aspect of a
total life experience appear to determine all its
products, concerns, and activities.
Once the type has been created, it can - it must -
be explained, and in depth psychology this explanation
takes place on the level of personality development.
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Daniel Levinson describes how this exolan^nb planatory process
selects subjects:
One of the most common tendencies is tointroduce personality factors in fhf Ithetical explanation of device but P°"that personality has little"o with the"
?t if
a
so
e
to
f
,
PrTiling— I^thifviewi s, speak, merely "normal" t-n ,n Twith group pressures, but'to deviate L* "
re^ance'^r ° f Personal*
Many things are interesting to the psychiatrist;
however, they become noticeable as an object for ex-
planation only when they deviate from the unexpected.
Once they deviate, all the force of medicine and science
must be brought to bear on their examination. if the
deviance is at a critical social nexus, its existence
must be eradicated. This does not take the form of
repression or political injustice; it is a cure. The
peculiar tyranny of the helping professions stems, not
from ill will, but from the importation of the language
of science, the language of fact rather than choice, into
areas of moral concern. The essence of scientia
, as
Michael Oakeshott describes it, is exactness and
precision of statement; this essence operates to "the
56
is
a
exclusion of whatever t , prlvafce<
^
ambl9U°US -" 15 her world, thescientist
bound to its constructs and spools if sne is to be
scientist. Personal understanding and flexibility of
judgment gives way in medicine to a teleology and a
reality that has no room for moral choice about
sexuality; and, just as one cannot choose the 'right'
sexuality, but must grow into it, so one cannot make
Private judgments about sexuality - the 'facts' speak for
themselves, telling us all „e need to know.
The consequences of this move were double-sided.
The turn to medicalization at the opening of the 20th
century resulted in arguments for tolerance and compas-
sion for those attracted to their own sex. Under the
sway of the idea that homosexuality was an illness rather
than a crime, sexologists such as Krafft-Ebing argued
that homosexuals should not be held legally responsible
for their desires, and should not be persecuted for a
'condition' which "was not a consciously chosen
preference"". The work of signmnd Freud slgnlficantly
extended this argument when he located homosexual desires
within the more general framework of sexual development;
this had the effect of suggesting that homosexuality was
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not even a disease.
However, the liberalizing influence of Freud and ^
sexologists was effectively subverted in the United
States by "a growing consensus in American psychiatry
that the condition is a serious psychopathology, that it
in all cases produces anguish and unhappiness for those
so afflicted, that it is clearly abnormal <not a variant
of normal sexuality,, and that, like all diseases, it
should and could be cured. "17 In the„ Qf practicing
American psychiatrists, the psychoanalytic medical model
has functioned
,
not to provide greater dignity and
respect for gays, but to base a minimal tolerance upon
the acceptance of medical authority over and medical
interpretations of their lives. Seeing themselves as
victims of heredity or childhood, lesbians and gays could
not afford to celebrate their sexuality and their
partners, to see them as the choices of reflective
adults. No matter how 'humanitarian' the practitioner,
the discourse of medicine functioned increasingly to
relegate homosexuals to second-class status, minimizing
both the possible social importance of their choice and
the extent to which individual problems might be
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reflective of sociaX attitudes and pressures^ ^
individual deformity.
The Rejection of Liberal ism
Most psychiatrists and psychologists argue quite
forcefully that homosexuals should have all the rights
and privileges of other citizens, and they oppose at-
tempts to single out gays for special legal treatment.
While holding firm to the "psychological consensus" that
"homosexuality is a symptom of neurosis and of a grievous
personality disorder
..
.manifested, all too often, by
compulsive and self-destructive behavior"18, most argue
that the illness is not itself a public danger, that
treatment is mandated only when the illness breaks out
into criminal behavior. This argument is that classic of
the liberal, an effort at containing conflict by
eliminating difference from discussion, and it fails.
With all their good will, with all their compassion and
attempts at understanding, the history of the gay
liberation and lesbian feminist movements begins
precisely with the rejection of the medical paradigm and
its participants.
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^ eXaC" y 15 thiS? ^ to this period, homo -
Phxle organizations" and homosexual individuals ^
sought out memoers of the psychiatric establishment to
serve on boards of directors ^nH «-a d to provide relief from
their problems. An early member explained:
At first we were so grateful just to have
come to our meetings; obviously, J turned outto be those who had a vested interestThavlus as penitents, clients, or patients *When somebody with professional credentials
t
C
rexLte
d
nce
eS
:f
yOUr that "Sizedrne existe o your organization. And thenwhen you went out and approached other peopleyou could say that Dr. So and So or the Rev Soand So had addressed you; that made you le^t0 thSSe
°th- P-P^ whom you
In order to maintain these contacts, the homophile
organizations needed, not simply to invite 'reputable'
speakers, but to maintain a rapport with them. Toby
Marotta explains that the price of this rapport was pub-
lic acceptance of the professionals' opinions:
To give their groups an aura of studious
detachment, the leaders refrained from as-
serting that homosexuals were as mentally well-
adjusted and as ethical as heterosexuals. To
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accommodate the views and interests of ,professionals
- most of wh™ S involved
1 Wo -i -; k ~ j UbC t om made their
to
VSf^03^00 "^T13^"' Bering
" they questioned the ttractivLess of^™traditional homosexual styles Ind th„ ,of the gay subculture. 21 morality
Thus TO see that, ultimately, the price being paid
by gays within this framework amounted to their self-
respect. If they really believed what was being said
about them, they could not truly see themselves as fully
human and adult; if they did not believe it, they were
living a lie to buy a minimal protection. During the
1960s, an increasing number of gays and lesbians began to
challenge the medical view of homosexuality as "ugly and
dangerous and self-defeating" . 22
They began to argue that the 'problem' of homo-
sexuality was not the sexuality of the individual, but
that, like the problems of other minorities, there is "
homosexual problem except that created by the hetero-
sexual society." 23
There were three responses to this charge. First
were the conservative psychiatrists, led by Irving
Bieber, Edmund Bergler, and Charles Socarides. This
group was quite clear in its opinions, and they under-
no
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stood the issues
. when challenged>
to accept homosexuality as normal is "to assault the
fundamental bulldlng blocks Qf aU ^
heterosexual bond and the family that springs from that
*«-.*« This is no smau Batter< indee^ ^ ^ ^
understanding, to sanction homosexuality would be not
only medically unsound, it would be antisocial.
in direct opposition to this group lay the radical
psychiatrists such as Thomas Szasz, Evelyn Hooker, and
Hermann Ruitenbeek, who had long been arguing that in
fact gays were an oppressed class, subject to persecu-
tion, whose illness (if any) was due t0 soclal stress
_
Seymour Halleck explained that often "a person is thought
to be disturbed because the psychiatrist or the community
doesn't know about all of the stress that causes him to
view his world as excessively oppressive.
. .very real
stress can be imposed upon someone without him knowing
its source. But he is not the only one who may have
difficulty perceiving the source of indirect stress;
often those around him cannot see it at all. "25 This
will be especially true when those around him are
imposing the stress, whether in the name of health,
morality, maturity, or any other. These psychiatrists
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could agree with their conservative counterparts that
heterosexuals had a big stake in the enforces of a
heterosexual norm; the point of dispute was over whether
that should continue. To the conservatives, the issue
was biological survival, and it would be insane not to
treat sexuality in such a light; to the radicals, the
issue was social organization and conformity. i„ this
light, the potential for change and the room for
diversity were considerably greater than in the first
case. in opposition to the 'building block' argument,
Szasz argued that the question was, "in sexual form, the
classic dilemma of popular democracy: How much diversity
should society permit?"26
Between the conservatives and the radicals stood a
group representing the classic American response to the
classic dilemma of popular democracy: the liberals. The
hallmark of the liberal in this battle is the position
which a radical labelled "a fundamental contradiction":
"that homosexuals are seriously mentally ill and
compulsively driven by needs over which they have no
control" while asserting "in the same breath that they
should not be subject to legal sanctions". 27
How can this be done, Quite siraply
, by separating
'P-vate' judgments, whether medical, moral, on reli-
gious, from one's be i iefs about 'public affairs, i.e.
issues of government and politics. The liberal psychi-
atrist is in the uncomfortable position of all egiance t0
two competing world-views
- the teleological and the
liberal, the Aristotelian and the individualist. This
dual allegiance is meade possible by the fact that the
modern medical view is not explicitly, self-consciously
teleogical, but rather is itself a child of the split
between 'is' and 'ought'. This split enables the doctor
or scientist to describe phenomena in terms that suggest
rank judgments and moral evaluations while denying that
these judgments have any relavance for public policy
except insofar as they act as a data base for political
debate. The realm of the political is sharply (if not
always clearly) divided from that of the medical, the
scientific
.
Because of this division, 'liberalism' quickly be-
came irrelevant to the discussion of homosexuality in the
medical community, being dismissed by the main
antagonists as, on the one hand, insufficiently attuned
to the social implications of medical judgments, and on
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posed by open homosexuality. The main partieg fcQ ^
debate became, on the one hand, the hardline conserv-
atives who found suoh devianoe "to be sufficient
justification for involuntary treatment and/or com-
mitment", and, on the other h,nH *-u6
° a d
'
the growing body of gay
liberationists and lesbian feminists who saw the full
implications of the medical model. Their reaction was to
begin to develop counter-explanations of homosexuality as
well as radical political recommendations. This
challenge began with the drive to remove homosexuality
from the list of illnesses in DSM-Ili, the American
Psychiatric Association's guide to diagnosis and
treatment of psychiatric disorders. The reaction of the
conservatives was predictable and direct; however, the
issue was (and is) very difficult for the liberals.
Their commitment to the medical paradigm led them to a
distrust of attempts to change judgments by a political
rather than scientific process, but their commitment to
justice and political equality fostered a sympathy with
the position of people whose lives were distorted by
others' hatred and fear. Writing in 1971, Dr. Halleck
noted that
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strengthen the star^
*Ctlvltles tending to
neutral. This medical or
By reinforcing^^^^^Power the psychiatrist is committing a
Oncf.S? *^
"hether ^ intends'tHAot
.
chiat-r^f- appreciated, the psy-rist's search for political neutralitybegins to appear illusory. 28
However,
'appreciating this fact' can be harder than
Halleck acknowledges. Even the psychiatrist who can
accept that his judgments will have political conse-
quences need not, within a liberal framework, assume
responsibility for that fact. Like the physicist who
only designs the bomb, the ontological and moral indivi-
dualism of the liberal allows him to distinguish
knowledge from its use, research from development, fact
from policy. Thus, the liberal becomes estranged and
impotent. Teleological systems do more than make rules;
they provide a basis for identity, for self- reflection
and evaluation. They provide a universe of positive
meaning for our acts, while liberalism is always forced
to fall back on other systems to provide meaning even as
it insists on their limitation. To the conservative, the
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liberal is weak-kneed, unable to face th* ir e implications of
what he acknowledges to be the truth. To the radical
the liberal is naive about sclence ^ poiitioS( ^
conseguently not a reliable ally. The scientific liberal
cannot deny what clinical experience and others- research
suggests, name iy that gays are disturbed and that
ho.osexuality is pathological; but neither can she deny
that they are hu.an, and therefore entitled to the claims
of justice.
Once the door is opened to the possibility that
homosexuality is not a crippling social condition, any
lesbian or gay man is given the option of self-respect.
However, that door cannot stay open simply on the basis
of intellectual laissez-faire; the medical perception of
the centrality of sexuality to modern social order
seemingly can only be countered by a theory that ac-
knowledges that centrality. The liberal attempt to make
sexuality a matter of what people do in bed does not have
the force of intuition behind it, and consequently argu-
ments based on such an understanding get pushed off stage
by both extremes. The fundamental insight of both gay
liberation and lesbian-feminism has been the need for
counter-explanations of the role of sexuality in
67
Personal^ organi 2ation as KeU as social
Tne chellenge for both is to provide these explanations
and new standards in a framework thafc ^ ^^
perpetu.te or initiate oppression. The liberal
psychiatrists were (and are
, trying to he faithful to
truth and its judgments while refraining from imposing
any unnecessary burdens in the lives of gays . while . fc
is easy to be impatient with or condescending to those
who fail to grasp post-liberal soci a i theory, it i s
impossible to dismiss their good win and efforts withQut
ourselves becoming the new doctors, the new elites of
consciousness. The fact that these people are still
vocal and supportive of gay' rights suggests that they
have some insight or intuition about society and politics
that we cannot ignore. In subsequent chapters, I will be
looking for that intuition that makes the American
liberal such a hardy breed.
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CHAPTER THREE
LESBIAN-FEMINISM: THE SEARCH FOR COMMUNITY
The clinical approach to homosexuality came under
'
in the late l 950 s as lesbians and gay men began to
question the validity „i „„ v..i r of psychiatric descriptions and
:udgments of their lives. Clinical portraits presented a
formed, stunted develops resulting in personal
tragedy and social instability. During the 1950s
, gay
that their position was analogous to that of other groups
seeking recognition and affirmation in American society,
notably blacks and women. Organizational efforts
blossomed, and with them arose the perennial issues of
social change movements: How much change is needed? What
sort of change? How soon? How is it to be achieved?!
At the same time, women's liberation was developing,
both theoretically and organizationally. Faced with
these questions, groups formed, splintered, developed,
proliferated. The call was for women, as women, to
examine and change the structures and relations that
burdened their lives.
The possibilities seemed infinite. Before the
advent of contemporary feminism, politically active
72
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lesbians had been isolate, from heterosexual women
WhSther
—~' « Predo.inantly raale homophUe
organizations or active in the Daughters of BiUtis
lesbians were acutely aware that they belonged to a
Population labelled pathological, and that they could
safely reveal their Sf>xnsHf„sexuality only to others within that
population. Indeed, before thp ^ • •
'
D r e feminism of the 1960s,
they would have little b^ic ^asis for non-economic interaction
with heterosexual women: the privatized lives of most
women kept those who worked outside the home isolated
from those who did not. The call of women's liberation,
however, was to every, woman. The energy of 'single'
women and working wives could now be shared with women
who could meet at night or on weekends, and bonds could
form. Previously bereft of vocal communities, the late
1960s found lesbians with two.
The price of membership in each was high, however.
Lesbians in the gay rights and gay liberation movements
found themselves in the position of women in the civil
rights, anti-war, and New Left movements - conceptual
appendages and organizational housekeepers/-
secretaries/sexual partners. 2 m the gay movements, this
conceptual annexation took the form of denial by male
leaders that lesbians faced ornhi omp oble s unique to them and
*- to their status as women; in reactlon tQ^ ^
specific treatment of the problems facing ^
society and complaints that these were ignored by raalehM°SeKUalS
' ~
lead" that "the Lesbian
.sic,
IS, after ali, a homosexual, first and foremQst . ^.^
to all - yes aii - of the problems of ^^^^^
and with no speciai problem as a Lesbian (sic, . "3 whUe
not caned upon to provide sexual services for the men
,
women in gay organizations found themselves faced with
the same assumptions about coffee-making and secretarial
duties as their heterosexual counterparts did elsewhere.
The consequence was likewise similar; lesbians began to
see their sex as an issue commensurable to, and perhaps
more fundamental than, that of sexual preference.
The influx of lesbians into the women's movement was
not unproblematic, however. The liberal feminists of the
National Organization for Women, in particular, were
extremely uncomfortable with lesbian claims of and
demands for solidarity; recognizing the power of the
epithet 'lesbian' to discredit feminism, and sharing in
the conventional attitude that lesbianism was a 'per-
sonal' issue separate from that of the public status of
75
-en, they tried tQ dQdge issue ^ ignoring
1SSbianiSm
"
S°me
~~« - -PP°rting institutions
Rita Mae Brown resigned from Now in January of 1970,
stating that
Lesbian is the one word that-
Executive Committee a collerY ^ theThis issue is dism?,«Jf Ve heart attack,
dangerous to c ^unimportant, too
excuse could he S « JL™repression. The prevailing attitude
frock ro
PP°Se th6y <n°tice the «ord, they)
111 fh ^ t
n droves? H°» horribi; afterall, t ink of our image. "4 Al
While more open to discussions of lesbianism and to
a lesbian presence, radical feminists also disappointed
the lesbians. This disappointment took two main forms:
first, the heterosexual feminists developed an analysis
of oppression and highlighted issues which seemed to
focus on relations between men and women as sexual and
life partners, which led lesbians to wonder where their
problems fit with those of other women; secondly, many
lesbians found themselves treated as prospective sexual
partners and instructors by women who were simply curious
about homosexuality and hoped to experiment without
commitments or attachments. The combination of these
reactions by liberals and radicals led the lesbians to
76
begin analysis of the rplan™ v,elation between their position as
women and their status as lesbians.
The Woman-Identified Woman
m 1970, at the height of the debate within femin-
ism over the "lavender menace", a group calling
themselves Radicalesbians wrote a paper discussing the
implications of lesbi^n-icm « • .ian s for feminism. At the second
Congress to Unite Women, held at the beginning of May
1970, "The Woman-Identified Woman" was distributed and
discussed, and the result was a completely new ground for
discourse about and understanding of lesbianism.
The centerpiece of "The Woman-Identified Woman" is
its answer to the question, "what is a lesbian?" The
answer is not to be found in psychology textbooks.
A lesbian is the rage of all women condensed tothe point of explosion. She is the woman who,
often beginning at an extremely early age, actsm accordance with her inner compulsion to be amore complete and freer human being than her
society
- perhaps then, but certainly later -
cares to allow her. These needs and actions,
over a period of years, bring her into painful
conflict with people, situations, the accepted
ways of thinking, feeling and behaving, until
she is in a state of continual war with
77
everything around her ,nH
self. she may not be' f v
With her
Political implications oi jhar?n 10S 8 ° f thepersonal necessity but- nn her began as
not been able ' ?? S ?me leve l she has
oppression laid on h^\t^"^ions and
her and why it i „
St
,
S°°lety has d°"e to
it to do so. 5
fun=t"nal and necessary for
in describing themselves thus, the members of
Radicalesbians hoped to convince their audience of two
points. The first is that of political unity. Both
lesbians and heterosexuals were painfully aware of the
presence and effectiveness of "queer-baiting" in the
"omen's movement; such baiting was what had given rise to
the 'lavender menace' argument in the first place. Such
attacks served two purposes; they increased public
suspicion and dislike of feminists, and they kept fe-
minists divided among themselves, with 'straight' women
fearful lest the lesbians make them 'look bad,' while
lesbians became angry and alienated from the women's
movement. Therefore, the Radicalesbians hoped to find a
common ground within feminism for all women by providing
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a theoretical counter tQ
understandingg ^
lesbianism.
The second point is treated theoretical in the
Paper, but the strategic ^
evident. »The Woman - Identlfied Woman „
^
radical feminist lesbians, and their ana lys is shows their
-ots. The core of radicai feminism is the idea that the
oppression of women is "fundamental", that is, that thrs
oppression is "cau<?an w a^sally and conceptually irreducible to
the oppression of any other group»6 Tn „ ,y u
•
I contrast to
those who analyze sexism or 'patriarchy' as a product of
capitalism or pre-liberal attitudes, radical feminists
argue that the oppression of women by men is the paradigm
and the root of all other oppressions and inequalities.
Radicalesbians utilized this analysis to suggest that the
oppression of lesbians is the direct result of the
oppression of women, and that it most clearly reveals the
contours of that oppression, insofar as the lesbian is
the ultimate pariah of male society; not only a woman,
but a woman-loving woman, a woman unattached to a man, a
being bereft even of an auxiliary identity. "For
feminists the main educational value of lesbian baiting
has been its exposure of the very clear connection in
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men's minds between being- w.ing unfeminme" and being
-dependent. Being called unfeminine is a c
-tie threat forming yQu ^
<~ively
9 Y that you are beginning to
the
--tory of Womanhood altogether,,
repeatedly contrasted to
' real wo ,man' in the popular
-d, and since the only difference ^ ^ ^
.
SeXUal
°
rientati
-"' «- Radicalesbians concluded
m this culturp "t-v^e, the essence Qf^ & ^ ^9etfUCkSdbymen " 8
- "™— cal feminist focus ^
Preference' to produce a comraon fcase ^ ^
heterosexual women.
The new analysis carried within it something more
than coalition, however ?h« „. The conclusion of "The Woman-
Identified woman" is that the basic structure of control
over women is that of sexuality, and in particular the
requirement of heterosexuality
. This is the structure
that must be rejected if women are to become whole
beings
.
Radical feminism's early analysis suggested that the
oppression of women was intimately related to their roles
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that sex oppression was basicallv ^y the oppression of sex
role-bearers, and that this com h k , •uld be eliminated through
the abolition of such roles and the eventual16 appearance
of the 'androgpous , person . ^^^ ^
arbitrary and stunting expectations and definitions
This analysis did not attack heterosexuality as an
institution, but only the
'unnecessary Hi • •cessary divisions between
men and women that made one's choice of partner and
sexual patterns socially significant^ Early radical
f6miniStS UVed
^ 3 — d of endless possibilities and
Protean selves, and all l imits . physical< psychological>
social, legal
- were equally oppressive. Freedo ra lay in
being able to decide for oneself what and who one was,
what choices were appropriate or fulfilling, rather than
being told by cultural representatives what being a wo.an
was about.
With the introduction of lesbianism as a central
issue, however, radical feminism found itself under
pressure. The agendas of lesbians and of heterosexual
women are indeed different. Lesbian feminists were not,
by and large, content to assert that one's choice of
sexual partner should be irrelevant to the quality of
one's life or one's participation in society. Though
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many lesbians indeed asserted, as did Martha sheUey<
that "I personally don't care who other wo.en are
3leeping „lth
, as long as someone x ^ sieeping
-10, the earlier experience of disapproval and
discrimination had left many lesbians suspicious of such
fine statements.
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do outside of betrLVcounS™"^'^ 0"
homosexuals have been trvinrr r „ t t fc
to understand for years Wen
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for liberalism. eLa^e w^t'i d outside^?
SaiSe
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- Sut
n0tMng t0 d
°
With ^insid b my consciousness is branded 1
«
permeated with homosexuality. For years' iLbeen branded with your label for L3*
The consequence of the historical fact of branding
was the need for a theory that could deal, not only with
some ideal future, but with the past; a theory that would
allow lesbians to feel at home somewhere in the present
by explaining rather than overlooking their difference.
Radical feminism's focus on sex roles seemed to speak to
the experience of gays, but the sexism on the part of gay
men suggested to lesbians that the problem ran deeper
than that. Increasingly, the issue of sex-roles gave way
to that of sex itself. While most were reluctant to say
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that men Eei_se were the problera
, aU agreed^ _ ^
constitute, by heterosexist society were
,^ ^
enemy
. „en - by nature
, fay
_ ^ ^
problem.
Not the least of the advantages of this treatment of
~» is lt
.
elimination of a constant, nagging quest ion
among feminists: the ^ ^^^ ^
answer can now be qiven «„i„K,fg straightforwardly: men must take
care of themselves. The priority for women, the truly
revolutionary call of feminism, must be for the union of
women. Rather than looking over their shoulders, trying
to drag their men with them, and limiting their feminist
activities to what will not destroy their relationships
with men, women are now called upon to focus on women, to
renounce the privileges that are part of involvement in
the dominant culture, in favor of the freedom and new
identity to be found in the company of women. This new
life requires withdrawal from the larger system on as
many levels as possible - economic, spiritual, emotional,
Physical. There is nothing to be gained, and everything
to be lost, by collaboration.
Separatism, then, is the order of the day. This
strategy directly exposes the needs of lesbians for
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"^"^
— »~adly, we can describe
these needs as threefold. First
, the
interpretation and valuation of igsbianism ^^
c-e, second, leshians need to deal with the
of their existence and participation in society; and
«urd
,
a sense of history raust be developed so that each
woman does not need to creafp , .te a universe of meaning anew
"The Woman-identified Woman" waS the first in a series of
theoretical and historical statements attempting to
eliminate alienation by locating lesbianism^ a
Positive framewor*
- a framewor* that is conducive to
personal esteem and to supportive relationships with
others. That framework is lesbian-feminism.
The Lesbian-Feminist
A lesbian-feminist is not simply a lesbian who is
also feminist; not all lesbians qualify, nor do all
feminists. The core of lesbian-feminism is the position
that sexism and heterosexism are "hopelessly inter-
twined", that the oppression of women and lesbians is
"the prototype for all other oppressions, since the
oppression of women and of lesbians crosses boundaries of
race, class, and age"12 Th<^ .9
•
There is, too, the radical
feminist view of the personal realm as DO , > •di Political;
"the
lesbian-feminist perceives herself asit a woman who real-
ises the political nature of her choir, t-n ce to commit herself
to sexual and emotional rP i aH n wrel tionships with women and to
^ond with them in her life,.13 The lesbian-feminist is
« a privileged position; over heterosexual feminists
she has the advantage of consistency between theory and
practice; over
'non-political' lesbiansbD
'
she can claim
the superior awareness of the r*™im-«r n evolutionary nature of her
sexual choice. These claims were in fact made
immediately - .„ you^ ^ lt ^ ^ ^
another woman, and that includes physical love, then how
can you truly say you care about women's liberation?^ -
and they remain a centerpiece of lesbian-feminism.
It is thus clear that lesbian-feminism rests on the
radical feminist collapse of the political realm.
Feminists have shown that the personal world, that world
left untouched by liberal political theory, is in fact
political, that is, riddled with power relations. By
bringing this to light, radical feminists hope to loosen
the hold of these power relations over women by
countering them, by invading their space with the
^course of freedom and forcing ^ justify
thSmSelVeS
°
r PSriSh
-
However, the perception
„ f ^
-to the rejection of any theoreticai pQsition
-tains a distinction between the realms. This has ^
e«ect both ef challenging au privafce relationsMps
Perhaps more dangerous, of making ^ ,^^ ^
Politic, epipbenomenal, that is, making it only the
-suit of the power dynam ics existent ^
society, incapable of being a iocus of any real change.
This coilapse of poiitics results, then, in the
perception of one's sexuality as a Matter of politics
not juSt at the level of i rapii cation . certain
-y lead one to maxe particular alliances, to view one's
public interests in a certain way - but at that of
session. By 3leeping with women, lesbians express
their commitment to a world that values women, and,
conversely, heterosexual women reveal themselves as torn,
half-hearted victims not entirely to be trusted. One's
body and its desires become a more reliable guide to
one's loyalties than words or public deeds. In this
perception, radical lesbian-feminists ally themselves
with the pattern of thought which Charles Taylor has
Ml,
of this
labelled
< expressivism'
. The central features
reaction to the Enlighten.ent picture of hu.ans can U
auaaed up as 1, anti-dUali sm - the rejection of any
division between mind and bodv • ?) t-hm , ,u o ay, 2) he valorization of
freedom, which i <=; c OQri u .n n s seen as being
"synonymous with self-
realization"
, as the rpnt-r.i in ce t al value of human life; 3) a
quest for union with naturp- 3nn a\e, a d 4) a drive for unity
with other humans. 15 Such a view rejects any dis-
tinction between public and private acts, seeing them all
as equally expressive of self. m acting/ in thinking/
in willing, in desire, we reveal ourselves as that which
we are.
The rejection of the public/private split, so
essential to feminism's insights, has its roots in the
perception that the barriers between family and commun-
ity, economy and state serve to veil power as much as to
protect individuals; or, rather, serve to sanction or
overlook non-public power. This is precisely the point
at which liberal psychoanalysts' ability to 'defend' the
homosexual broke down, and the rejection of the
distinction provided the opening for women to
problematize and challenge their 'private' oppressions.
However, the expressivist goes beyond problemat izat ion
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and critique; in her total reiectinnj o of any such split
she removes any ground for . more
Of the relations between public and private structures
and action, of the gaps and spaces as well as the
connections
.
in their expressivism, radical lesbian-feminists are
in greater agreement with their old opponents than with
liberal sympathies
.
The hysterical reaction to
homosexuality rested in part on this same belief that
sexuality is expressive of one's social being, when she
says that she is "disloyal to civilization", Adrienne
Rich agrees that her existence is pointed toward the
destruction of a culture and a history that has destroyed
women. Rather than transcendence of the old categories,
however, what we see in lesbian-feminism is what
Nietzsche would call their reversal. The lesbian-
feminist and the conservative psychiatrist are in
agreement as to the facts; the issue is one of valuation.
In The Will to Power, Nietzsche states that "values
and their changes are related to increases in the power
of those positing the values"^. However, rather than
direct battle for moral hegemony, what we today witness
is the proliferation of evaluations, each reflective of a
particular power base, a local rH „1 dlscou"e within which theee 3 of that communlty
expressed
_ ^^ Qf
COmmUnlty 13
—^—d to the revaluation
relnterPretati
°" °f^ existence. Just as
in the search for truth anx/and/or as the discourse of social
control of bodies, so may lesbian f„™l feminism be understood
simultaneously as the reflection of a particular
understanding of the position of women, as the theo-
retical formulation of lesbian identity, and/or as the
new logic of inclusion/exclusion
, with its own foci for
control. These perspectives are not mutually exclusive;
-deed, any understanding or theory contains the logic of
demarcation, and all control beyond brute force is
worlds. The denial of any
on the part Qf
theorists serves today only as the opening for their
opponents' critique, while the rejection of all
justifications for controls and limits leaves us bereft
of any conceptions of authority or meaning. Either
denial is an invitation to nihilism.
One of the fundamental contributions of Nietzsche is
his insight into the dynamic of nihilism in the West.
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This dynamic has its root inln the search for a meaning
that transcends the phenomenal world _ ^^ ^
metaphys ics.
meaning and the inability to accentY p a world of Becoming,
of constant change and struggle ThP n •y i . e opening move of
metaphysics, then, is to nositp a meaning that is
"0rU:
^
be9inS « posited a totallty
, a
systematization, indeed an»y organization in ail events,
and underneath all events » rf, and a soul that longs to
admire and revere has wallowed in the idea of s ome
supreme for, of donation and administration <-lf the
soul he that of a logician, complete consistency and real
dialectic are quite sufficient to reconcile it to
everything,...17 Underneath ^^^ ^ ^
urge to deny win, t0 relieve ^ Qf
responsibility for coming to terms with the world.
In the years since the concept of the 'woman-
identified woman' emerged, a particular strain of
lesbian-feminist analysis has developed which engages in
this sort of metaphysical totalization
. The desire to see
the world as a seamless (if corrupt) whole has resulted
in the revival of ontological dualism - a new
Manicheanism, if you win
_ treed fcom the perception of
»ith the,, lesbian-feminists such as Mary^^
Raymond, and Sally Qearharf k,y G t have accorded men the status
of ontological oppressors, depriving them of any
Possibility of fundamental changed That raost of^things have emerged from Catholic theological schools
i. Perhaps no accident; while affording the possibility
of an alternative to the poverty of liberalism,
Catholicism also carries within it the impulse to
understand the world in unitary terms. Just as the early
Church had to face Manicheanism, so we now have to
understand the temptation to divide the world in order to
understand it.
The new ontology divides the world into men and
women. Men, it seems, are irredeemable; they may strug-
gle to break their own bonds, but in so doing they are
fighting their own nature as much as they are opposing
society. The battle is too hard, the fight too
exhausting, to expect any to win. Jean Elshtain has
noted that "the radical feminist portrait of man re-
presents, in some ways, an inversion of misogynist views
of women". 19 The portrait is of a being diseased by
nature, infected with what Ti-Grace At-vb Atkinson labels
"
metaPhYSlCal
-is cannibal^ is char.
aC
T
iZed
^
" thS nSed
^ ^ «« «- «*• of oPPres-
sor" in order to fill +-v,~their inherent void. 20 This is
extended by Daly
'
wh
°—teri2es men as .. demon,,
sadists who Hvo ^-f-plive off women's blood 21 Mrv(_, .a> Nothing short of
re-creation can change that.
Women, on the other h.nH a61 a d
'
are fundamentally
"bio-
PhlUC
" nUrtUri
-'— -ith nature and the earth
gainst the necrophUic male worH
_ ^ ^^^^^ ^
goals of expressivism, woraen strive for uniQn ^^
and one another; women do not divide themselves
, body
from spirit; women, lik*e e other animals, wish only to live
free and in harmony. Thev ri rPy. in y a e, however, capable of
degeneration from their natural sfatP ^ •mu i t e of virtue. if this
were not the p^qo -,ncase, all women would recognize and act on
their sisterhood. Just- aost s the psychiatrists needed to
explain how the aberration of homosexuality is possible
in a being 'naturally' heterosexual, lesbian feminists
find themselves called upon to explain this misalliance
and collaboration. Much lesbian-feminist scholarship is
devoted to examples and explanations of the ways in which
women are perverted by men, made to see men's battles and
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idSntified
'' defl
— in terms aUen tQ
thSmSelVeSandtheirt
-—
. Male-identi fication
» ^Man-feminist false consciousnesS( aiienation
oneself,
The reclamation of one' q fom is female energy, 0 f
'*y™gs . if you wlu
, requires &
_
ti0n
^ rej6Cti0n ° f ^ -rophili c elements
in one's internal and ^ ^
by contemporary theorists
, phllosophers ^
society of the fundamental role of ^ ^^
ture of our worlds is mat =hed in lesbian-feminism, and
this recognition has made the construction of
discourses and languages centra l to the project of
building a home. Mary Daly's two most recent boo.s,
Syn/lcoloay snd Purest, engage deliberately and
painfull y in a process of re-definino ,„ rfu nni g and re-naming the
world around her: "Since the language and style of
patriarchal scholarship cannot contain or convey the
gynergy...i invent, dis-cover, re-member words . "23 she
shares in this with many other lesbian-feminist scholars
and poets; this project is seen as crucial.
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The New Lesbian
and
most
central word in all this is< ^ surprisingiy;
term ' leSMan
'- ^ the ™cation ot .. The Woman _
Identified Woman" and the creation of a lesbiand -LesiDia vanguard
the guestion of who ot what a lesbian is has been
present. The questlon is not merely &^ ^
theoretical clarity. In raost of ^^
bx«« is clearly understood, whatever stereotypes
valuations are attached to it. a lesbian, to
English-speakers, is a woman who engages in sex with
women; a homosexual woman. It is on the basis Qf^
definition that male gay-rights activists proclaim common
cause with lesbians; the definition locates the
problematic difference in the choice of sexual partner.
This definition, however, does not serve the needs
of the newly-conscious group of women who do not see any
common cause with male homosexuals and who face isolation
from other women. Lesbian-feminists cannot settle for
equal rights in a male-identified world; their project is
to build a woman-identified, woman-loving world, and to
do this they must deal anew with the perennial issues of
social theory. Engaging in a radical process of
"cultural reconstruction", lesbian f. •
'
l
-femmists must startfrom the ground up.
This process of reconstruction has
, as stated
Sarlier
'
threS
'•
-aluation of lesbianismi
explanation o f the status of ^ ^
world, and historical iocation of a community. Recent
-search info women's history supports this by providing
a sense that, in fact, this 'community of women' has
always existed, but has been overlooked by
historians. The project of 'herstory' i s t0 reveal that
community so that contemporary lesbians will not be
alienated and isolated, suffering from the constant need
to begin communities and originate identities. By
discovering earlier
'resistance' to heterosexual
imperatives, lesbians can provide themselves with both
analysis and history, a 'cultural etiology' of sorts, a
positive ground for self-understanding and meaning. The
sense of aloneness, of negativity that is so central to
being significantly different in society is relieved by
replacing the society with one which affords positivity.
Within the new community, everyone is a lesbian;
however, that does not make lesbianism irrelevant. In
keeping with the nature of reversal, lesbianism is
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essential
,
a lesbian identity is now t-hY 13 e Price of admis-
S1 °n
^ ^ community', the proof of trust-
worthiness. Sexuaiity remains the final test of one's
loyalty to civilization.
There are two problem, with thls
. The first ^^
of exclusion. „ the claim^ lesbianism ^
Privileged is to be credible, theorists have to deal with
the embarrassing evidence of non-feminist or anti-
feminist lesbians, with those lesbians who live in
butch/femme roles and relationships, and with those who
like men. The valorization of lesbianism seems inevit-
ably to lend support to these women's choices, but they
are completely unacceptable to the new lesbian feminist.
The other problem is that of inclusion. Particularly
when looking to the past, one can never be sure about the
nature of the relation between any two women. Many women
whom contemporary lesbians would like to claim as
ancestors and models present either ambiguous evidence of
sexual activity with other women, or no evidence at all;
and yet their inclusion seems essential. How can these
problems be resolved?
The answer has been to redefine the word 'lesbian'
so as to include those women that seem to provide posi-
ives and
we
tive models while excluding^ ^ Aph^_
menon that inif^n,,tially MZa" e^ on waning when
it beco.es dear what is at stake
.
. ft^ ^
miSlSading t0 SU^ St issue is one o f defini-te alone..
.
lt concerns ^^ ^ ^
the kind of social and political i„tinterpretation that
as women brino tn f,„r 1g o our lesbian existence . "24 It also
concerns the demarcation nf t-h=o the community, both hist-
orically and in the present.
What, then, is a lesbian? There have been several
prominent definitions, all shades of a new color. A
widely cited and popular one is that of Blanche Wiesen
Cook in her article,
"Female Support Networks and
Political Activism: LiUian Wald, Crystal Eastman, Emma
Goldman". 25 In this pieC6/ she ^ ^
"women who love women, who choose women to nurture and to
create a living environment in which to work creatively
and independently". She explains that "lesbians cannot
be defined simply as women who practice certain physical
rites together... physical love between women is one
expression of a whole range of emotions and responses to
each other that involves all the mysteries of our human
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nature. Woman-related women feel attract-'raction, yearning,
and excitement with women. "26
"nat is most striking in this definition is the
feature that it shares with most of the new definitions
This is the derogation of sexuality or sexual behavior as
a defining characteristic of lesbianism, while retaining
a focus on „omen, the new definitions unanimously reject
the 'clinical' concept as itself sufficient, what is
central to lesbianism now is, not the act but the
emotion; or, rather, not the sexual act but the verbal,
emotive and political acts. Far from being sufficient
demonstration of one's loyalties, lesbian sexuality may
now in fact confuse the issue; Adrienne Rich argues that
sexual lesbians who have otherwise bonded with men have
subverted the cause of women. 27 while she sees a
"nascent feminist political content in the act of
choosing a woman lover or life partner"28, this contenfc
can only be "realized" through conscious women-
identification
- the adoption of lesbian-feminism.
The Radicalesbian description of the lesbian in
terms of rejection of social roles rather than those of
desire found fertile ground among feminist lesbians,
whose prior experience of persecution for sexual choices
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qUite W
— to downplay or ignore fchis
understanding;
"Lesbian cultural r •U fem"rsts- insistence
leSbianiSm iS
-
t««
-
"«di=al female friend _SUP
"
rathSr tha
"™—ce reflects an un-
witness t0 ««t that within the iarger culture
lesbianism is viewed as a
"perversion 29.. Hn. owever, such
a simple explanation of the shift rion does not do justice to
the full complexity of the i£sue
_ Def . nition , s a
process of location r>*, of the investiture of meaning, and
this meaning goes beyond its motivation as well as
extending past the words themselves. m speaking of the
truth of propositions, Hans-Georg Gadamer stresses that
it is a matter neither of "factual correctness and
congruence, nor solely of "the content in which it
stands", but rather rests on "its enrootedness and bond
with the person of the speaker in whom it wins its truth
potential"; that truth "can be disclosed only if one
traces its history of motivation and looks ahead to its
implications". 30 The same may be said of definitions;
they are 'true' to the extent that they resonate in us
and make sense of the world, and this is a matter both of
motivation and of (perhaps unseen) implication.
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What, then, does the 'non-.i inon-clinical' definition oflesbianism disclose? what is it-, k
it?
15 l S b0nd t0 those who adopt
In their rejection of a definifnition based on sexual
ehavior
' — have drawn on and expanded
the critique of genital<
, goal.directed( ^^^^^
dSVelOPed
^ —dians after World War „ and
Brown.31 This critique ^
SSXUaUty
"
lth Capitalis
- - cane. for the return of
the
'polymorphous perversity , characteristic of infantue
sexuality. The assault Qn genitai ^
combined with the critique of instrumental reason de-
veloped in the Frankfurt School and framed the calls for
cultural revolution characterist i r nf #>,j-a^Lerisr c o the post-1950s
West
.
In feminist circles, this analysis took the form of
an opposition between male and female natures, masculine
and feminine values and modes of relation. Men are
instrumental, competitive, compulsively aggressive, and
slaves to a goal (orgasm)
-oriented sexuality; women are
nurturant, cooperative, beyond linear/logical thinking.
This is reflected in their sexuality; as Alice Echols
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— s it, wlthin radical femlnism „women/s
« -sumed to be more spiritual than sexual> and
considerably less cenfcral tQ thgir uves ^
sexuality to men's. For instance, Mrienne Rich
deserts female sexuality as an 'energy which ls
the body itself ' "32 T. In contrast/
„male sexuaUty ^
driven, irresponsible, crenll-an,,e, genitally oriented, and potential-
ly lethal
... Men rrs1m ^• c ave power and orgasm, while women seek
reciprocity and intimacy. "33
It is simple enough to see in this the return of
pre-feminist dichotomies between men and women, and this
is indeed dangerous; however, that is not the central
point here. Our concern, rather 1, t„ .
-
t mer, ls o see, not simply
how the redefinition of lesbianism depends on and
reinforces distinctions between the sexes, but to examine
its implications for 'the living of lesbian lives'. The
motivation for redefinition - the establishment of
positive identity, community, and history - can be
evaluated only after the discernment of its consequences
for the actual self-understandings of lesbians.
Christopher Lasch has argued that the social and
conceptual oppositions of masculine/feminine, instru-
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-tal/holistic, and isolated/related are in fact two
— s of the „ legacy of primary narcissismll( which seeks
to deny the fact of dependence on a world beyond^
He asserts that both sides ^.^
MtUmi
°" " f— ° f~n
, the .. feminine „ lQnging
for symbiosis no less so than the soliMc ..^^
drive for absolute mastery ...3 4 Seen .„ ^ ^ ^
choices rai! t0 0pen up the room for us to develop as
UniqU6
'
C°nfliCt-ridto individual. trying to live with
others, and so leave us in continual danger of threats to
our selfhood, our personhood, by those who approve of us
as well as those who do not.
That something of this is latent in the ^de-
finitional process was seen by Barbara Gittings quite
early. m a critique of "The Woman-Identified Woman",
she argues:
sexist ^^^^
dS an Unhappy ^"Product of a
l^tf °^tural set " uP- She is supposed to becontinually at war with sexism and male
supremacy, yet guilty for not meeting society's
onTv ^
10USy' She gain ,,ma*™ autonomy"
halL t
e
Z
ldentlfy^ with other people - theb tch of human beings who happen to be female -and joining in a collective search for an
authentic selfhood.
.. In sum, the lesbian needs
a different sense of self and can't be trustedto come up with it on her own without benefit
of group-think.
. .The contorted theory of woman-
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also claimed th^K°*^tic th6°rieS th"
outcome of a fa,,n-„ .
iesblar
>
was a faulty
reconstructing 35^ P ^ "eeded
WhSther
" ~ «~ tU, Somewhat polemi .
cal Presentation of the problem, it does point fco ^tissues for the 'lesbian community'. In looking at
Psychological issues presented in tne Los Angeles
lesbian-feminist community, Sherry McCoy and Maureen
Hicks have noted that "the sometimes visionary politics
of feminism have contributed to our making unrealistic
demands on each other "36.
ZfTJSToi £ o—^suTit-
l^lTsT
-t
d
;
:r -"~d
significance. WomeTwh \ ^sen It^Zl
tnat "?e
ei
^
Se
^
al and naftSen ity" un
9
dh l sbian" and "dyke" were oosifiJi,,valued identities within tM^^X,and they joined in giving each other
beliefs 'a^H
3
'?
n9 33 WS V°Wed homa9e to thend values officially espoused by thecommunity as a whole, we were able to
experience a common magical union. 37
Thus the problem that emerges is not simply that
women are still being characterized as loving, nurturing,
virtuous beings, in contrast to rapacious man; the
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are no
fUndamSntal ™- is "at, as leSbians, they1- sublet t0 what Heidegger wouM „
subjectiJ 2 _
— they are at the hands Qf psychiatric ^
tabliShment
- ^— - «, sub jectivi z ing impulse
« the refus.l to ,. let beings; ben< ^ rathec ^ ^
has been accepted in lesbian . femlnism fche
lesbren, but the LesMan . p0litically/sexnauy
/=ulturally correct being, the carrier of ^ ^^^^
feminist consciousness. The eommunity^ t-^
this valuation is indeed a home, but it is not the
of free, adult human beinos tv^o g . The problem is not the act
of separation, the moment of seoarat- i .m .paratism; some such space
is clearly necess ary for many „omen
, as a welcome
antidote to ub iqu itous male power and presence. The
problem lies in the grounds and terms of this seperetion.
A separatism that is grounded on the metaphysical
difference between male and fema ie essence, and that
characterizes those essences as radical lesbian-feminists
have done, leaves little or no room for the development
of diverse, individual patterns of relationship with the
larger society The legitimate drive for community
degenerates into unmediated unity, a unity that carries
104
- if twin an excessive fear of ^^^^ ^ ^
~. m . metaphysical ^ lesbian . feminism;
is its central weakness.
Lesbian-fe.inis™ has developed in response to
Political and psycho-social disenfranchise^.
In this
context
, it was immediately percelved some ^
co^unity was needed to counter this silence. What is
only now beco.ing clear is the cost of simp i e unlty
unlisted by individual differences. Such unity can
only be achieved through the imposition of certain
categories and the denial or outright rejection of any
other possibilities. Some ^position, some definition,
is of course indispensable to our understanding and
communication; however ^ Hi.n , a discourse that does not admit
the possibility of alternative discourses or new
categories that challenge the old is a discourse solely
of domination, not that of politics. The first necessity
for politics must be the recognition that others exist
independently of oneself, and that these others are no
less 'real' or 'valid' for that.
The painful perception of the limits of a naive
liberalism which arose in the 1960s resulted in a romant-
ic reaction which focused on destroying the high walls
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SreCted
— -—
,
- t,is reaction has
suffered from the same deficiencies as ^^
^^"^ mOVementS
' *~ of these deficiencies are the
collapse of the public sphere and fh«y t e compensatory
'politicization' of all r*i ur i relationships and values; the
introduction of the notiQn Qf a pre _poiiticai communit^
a natural unity that might soraehow be regained; ^ ^
withdrawal from larger society poUty ^
reactions to an alienating world, they oannot be taken as
sufficient solutions to the problem of lesbian or female
identity and status. Just as the unreflective
appropriation of Rousseau led to the Terror, just as the
modern philosophers of the will have too often been used
in the service of anti-liberal and anti-democratic
movements, so too the blanket rejection of American
liberalism has led lesbian-feminists into the tyranny of
transparency, the world of black and white without
shadows or nuance. That this was not intended is
certain; that it must be corrected is equally so. The
search for a home must stop short of narcissism if
liberty is to exist for whole human beings, just as
liberty must stop short of social disintegration and
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individual alienation if we ^
a^ t^
lndlVidUalS
'-
U to be seen whether lesbian-
feminism can accomplish this.
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CHAPTER FOUR
SADOMASOCHISM: the challenge OF DIEEERENCE
A" great social and poUtical changes generate
further movement. Some of r hic *6
° t ls development will be in
the nature of reaction, attempts to restore mi-esuo a conceptual
and Political status quo
. oust as much activity^
result from the extensions of the new thought and
discourse, and their interaction with the existing world
an°ther S°UrCe
°
f~h
-
the reaction of those
within a movement to its inevitable limitations and re-
strictions. Each of these rh»n=„„cn challenges serves to deepen
our understanding of the largest dimensions of the new
thought by revealing its assumptions, its tendencies, and
its strategic location in society, within the new
discourse, it may be difficult to ascertain the true
character of any new issue; reaction may pose as
revolution, fulfillment may be perceived as a threat,
according to one's understanding of the nature and goals
of the movement. It is at this point that the individual
finds herself pressed to define her own understandings of
and aims for her community.
Lesbian-feminist discourse about sex has arrived at
this place. At the beginning of the movement, issues of
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sexuality were conceived of and Hi.o r discussed in terms of
Partner choice. The need to form a positive
understanding of lesbianism found a home in feminist
discussions of sex and gender oppression and the role of
Personal relations in maintaining larger social and
political inequalities. The insiaht- t-h -Slght that ™e must examine
all aspects of our lives i * Tia af we are to see what Marilyn
Frye has called the 'birdra<T«'cage of oppression, that
network of 'minor' barriers fh^ „c t at composes a system of
immobilization, was bound to the lesbian experience of
silence and fear to produce a systematic analysis of the
relations between lesbian oppression and that of women as
a whole.
This analysis retained the primary bifurcation
between heterosexual and lesbian, but it gradually
shifted both the valence and the meaning of lesbianism.
Lesbianism now had less to do with sex, and more to do
with emotional commitments. This shift was the result of
pressures both theoretical and practical. The early
hostility and fear toward lesbians on the part of
heterosexual feminists was disarmed by the relocation of
lesbianism with the pre-existing discussion of female
separatism and difference, whereby lesbianism was
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Present as the Qf ^ ^0rd6r
^
make tMS^ ^ a suspicious audience
however
' iesMans~ - ^imize sex and emph;size
atUCtaMt; AUCS
— - «*- that ,the homophobia,
and, to a lesser extent, the anti-sex attHt „i udes within
certain elements of the movement precluded lesbian-
feminists from promoting lesbianism as a sexual rather
tnan a political choice."! Lesbianism became 'safe' by
becoming something other than what it had been, a
creature no longer of physical desire but of political
desire
- the desire for eoirsir qual, non-oppressive personal
relationships
.
Standards for acceptable sexual behavior have been
derived from the conceptions of woman held by the primary
theorists of lesbian-feminism. The portrayal describes
women as passionate, yet not genitally-focussed; passion
for women is more a general life force than particular
sexual desire. Women's sexuality, in this view, is
diffuse, tender, committed, and reciprocal. As relations
between women, then, and particularly woman-loving women,
lesbian sexuality is sharply contrasted to both hetero-
sexual and homosexual male sexuality. Mary Daly's
contrast between "biophilic" sisterhood and "necrophilic"
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"male m°n0gender ms^" to sexuality; while
PaSSi °n aims at
— - celebration of
Self and other, male desire tsquires conquest and
annihilation for its satisfaction.
The consequences of this thought became apparent by
mid- 1970s
,
and the tension has escalate. steadily
intimacy be egalitarian and 'correct' „»= *was denial and
repression. Unsure of their desires and their
Plications, lesbian-feminists generally deemphasi zed
the importance of sex in women's lives, while this
strategy fit comfortably with the need for acceptance and
a sense of historical continuity with non-sexual woman-
bonded women, it imposed a great stress on individual
lesbians at the most personal, most complex, and least
understood point in their u„«,n lives. In reaction, many women
chose to not have sexual relations at all. others
worried, as did heterosexual feminists, about the meaning
of their desires and fantasies. A movement that began by
addressing the problems of a minority defined by
sexuality was rapidly approaching the point where
community acceptance required as much repression and
concealment of one's sexuality as before.
In 1976, the first sounds of rebelliono ii were heard
In an article entitled
"Cathexis" kX1S
'
Barbara ^th announced
that she was a leshian-fQm' •b n-femmist who was also a
Sad0maS°ChiSt
- °
thSr~ he, lead, and by
1980 Sad~
-s a serious and dlvisive issue
within the lesbian-feminist
communifcy
_ ^
SVery neWSP3Per
'
eV"y lesbian-feminist group has
been the site of furious ar„t and
Every side accuses the other <s, of bad faith, of
dogmatism, of self-serving motives, and of destruction of
the women's movement.
Pleasure and Power: The Dilemma of Sexuality
The basic question of the debate has been, is
lesbian sadomasochism consistent with feminism? Such a
question is intriguing partly because it is so
unexpected. Sadomasochism is a practice that has found
few public defenders. It is, as Gerald and Caroline
Green describe it, "the last taboo"2. Its emergence as
topic for debate, and especially as a topic capable of
splintering the lesbian community, suggests that some-
thing radical has happened, not only to our ideas about
a
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is not the question itself ifho u(though certainly that is
interesting), but rather/
L-uex or its emergence
Why should sadomasochism be an issue for fwb r eminism? why
« tMs an issue for lesbian-feminists^ what
tendencies of lesbian-feminist theory? These are ^
faSCi
-tin
- — deeply troublesome questions ^
must be grappled with.
It is not at all surprising that the anti-
pornography women, and many others, have not seen a
connection between feminism ,nHa d sadomasochism.
"Given
prevailing ideas of appropriate feminist sexual behavior
S/M appears to be the mirror opposite. It is dark and
polarized, extreme and ritualized, and above all, it
celebrates difference and Power."3 The image Qf^
sexuality developed by lesbian-feminists leaves no room
for such a desire; to even conceive of finding pleasure
in such a mode is to betray one's female soul, to fall
victim to male thinking and desire, m order for the
question of feminism to be assort ^ ^u Ked at all, then, something
must have given way.
T
° Unde~ the polarization that has ^^^^^
* ,s necessary t0 examine ^^
diSC°UrSe
°" * late l 970 < S and 1980 . s
That dlSC°UrSe 1S thS °«e bounding pornography A
focus on male predation and violence
9r°Und UP°n WMCh
and lesbian feminists
-Id meet
. It allows lesMans tQ heterosexuaUty
xn language that finds acceptance amMg heterosexuai
feminists, making a secure place fQr lesbianism ^
exposing the danger of men. By claiming the shared
status of victims of male rage and lust/ women can
overlook or deny the differences among themselves that
have been so painful.
However, such a strategy has problematic
consequences. Carol Vance asks: "if women organize
around their oppression by and through differentiation
from men, should they not maintain a united front,
stressing their shared and unifying characteristic,
femaleness?"4 The "fear of difference among women" that
She perceives, and the inability to work through or with
that fear, result all too often in the theoretical denial
of relevant difference. The anti-pornography movement
has derived its energy in part from its ability to
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command the loyalties =r,wpiti and perspectives of many diverse
^e first cost is that of overemphasizing sexual
danger. Vance notes that r = «, far from liberating women to
be themselves, the anti-pornography movement
..restates
the main premises of the old gender system: the dominant
cultural ideology elaborates the threat of sexual danger,
so the anti-pornography movement responds by pushing for
sexual safety via the control of public expression of
-le sexuality.
. . the focus continues ^ ^
sexual pleasure for women is .hh .u still minimized and the
exploration of women's DleasursHi * «P able experience remains
slight. -5 In keeping with thig/ the Qf
anti-pornography movement have repeated the lesbian-
feminist rejection of talk about "sexual liberation",
seeing in it only "the patriarchal trick- of 'relaxation
of taboos' ".6 women, it seems, are sexually ensnared
within patriarchy; while the restrictions of male-
dominated morality are odious, even worse is the abandon-
- nt of those restrictions in a quest for pleasure. Such
quest can only lead to destruction, to male domination,
whether physical or psychic.
me
a
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The second cost i c *-v,«xa the consequence of this emphasis
Within an embattled atmosphere th«, ese women simply cannot
afford to appreciate diversity or any politics that
a— s it. Appeals for the recognition ^ differences
among women
- whether they be diffon o differences of class, race
sexual preference, or any other - are translated in this'
context into threats against a dement, elements that
would splinter and destroy the true fh»c
'
t e central, the
m°St lmP°rtant Unit
^ Th* "suit has been described in
Chapter Three; the inability to differentiate, to account
for irreducible multiplicity among women, leads only to
political isolation and individual conformism. The
threat of community expulsion and withdrawal of
validation serves to keep lesbians in place just as
surely as does the charge of pathology.
The feminist discourse of the 1970' s succeeded in
removing lesbianism from the realm of the pathological,
but only by recasting it in less sexual terms and
concurring in other social judgments about sexual
deviance, within the lesbian community, however, much
discussion was devoted to the idea of desire, of passion,
of female sexuality as a source of strength and joy.
Secure in the knowledge that lesbian desire was life- and
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~- afflrraing
, women were exhorted ^ ^^^^^^bodies and pleasure.
Confession and Conformity
in this context, lesbian sadomasochists began to
talk about what they did. The history of lesbian .
feminis, had endowed them with two basic beliefs that
-de this not only desirable, but neoessary. Pirst was
the idea that one's sexuality is a oolite ,J-L-y p litical matter, part
of a seamless web of the expression of self. Second was
the reliance on community evaluation for one's identity
and behavior that has been so problematic for
contemporary lesbians. m reaction to a hostile society,
lesbian-feminists created a shelter and a framework for
the development of a self not at war over its sexuality.
Gayle Rubin describes the impact of this early community:
I did not experience the full force ofhomophobia. On the contrary, to be a baby dykein 1970 was to feel great moral self-
confidence. One could luxuriate in theknowledge that not only was one not a slimyPerert, but one's sexuality was especiallyblessed on political grounds. As a result, I
never quite understood the experience of beinggay in the face of unrelenting contempt. 7
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h
S6nSe
"
mandate f°r
—™ y , lesbiansbS9an
" ab°Ut - 3Pecificaily
, they adQpted a
P-ctice that is Known as , coraing out , . reveaung
sexual preference to those around one in order fcQ^
the silence and presumptions that reinforce
Coming out makes the possibility and actuality of
difference more visible, with the aim of enhancing both
the awareness of others and the self-esteem of the one
coming out. "The open avowal of one's sexual identity
explains John D" Erailio, "whether at^ ^ ^
home, or before television cameras, symbolized the
shedding of the self-hatred that gay raen and women
internalized, and consequently it promised an immediate
improvement in one's life. To come out of ^
quintessentially expressed the fusion of the personal and
the political that the radicalism of the late 1960<s
exalted. "8
Marie France states that "Coming out is predicated
on three assumptions: that sexual practice has to do with
personal identity, that the two are one and the same, and
that voicing one's identity is the best way of 'knowing'
it". 9 These assumptions lie at the heart of both gay
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liberation and lesbian-feminism. They are
understandable; as noted in Chapter Two th.i
'
e sense that
sexual practice reflects ^ri , indeed manifests, one's
essential identity not only Ues at the heart of modern
Psychiatr, hut is basic t0 our contefflporary ^ ^
thinking about sex and sexual difference.
Tne third assumption also has a long past in Western
societies. „ichel Foucault has ^ ^
confession is a rpnt-r^i „ice t al element in Western life:
The confession has spread its pffo„ „
wide. it nbvq » t • ef ects far and
SffiS' n-t¥ --"°-hiP
-e
;nr^-
everyday life and'Tfn^""* a"alrS of
one confesses' one's cr "e^on f^" rit6S;
thoughts and desires™^ InrlstlTL?*'*troubles; one goes about telling with tLgreatest precision, whatever is^foif ficult
in making this point, Foucault is concerned to show us
that the techniques and aims which we see as central to
freedom serve instead to constrain us through their
elicitation and publication of our most private selves.
The confession plays a central role in this constraint;
originally treated as an obligation, it has become a
necessity, the necessity of revelation.
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the cohtr.
f
ry? it Se^o^tS"8^ 8 ^ °"in our most secret nat,,^ f„ truth, lodged
surface; that if it
'' d™S ' t0
cause a constraint h i °i °f°'
this be-
violence of * ™ T n Plac e, the
finai ly
C
be° arti
^ a
r
t:r?n
h8
y^t
d
tT' ^ " C»kind of liberation. 11 Y he price ° f *
Central to this necessity is the belief that the intent
of power is negative; that is, we are hound to the idea
that power demands that we be silent t-wi , hat we repress the
truth and constrain ourselves 3n H r>VSS/ a d
'
conversely, that our
liberation requires defiance of this command. These
beliefs form the base, not only of Christian confession,
but of psychoanalysis and other psychologies, and of most
modern social and political theory. They lie at the base
of feminism; the descriptive phrase 'the personal is
political' quickly became prescriptive, enjoining
constant, minute analysis of our lives. "if what we are
talking about is feminism then the personal is political
and we can subject everything in our lives to scrutiny.
•
•
If we are to scrutinize our human relationships, we
must be willing to scrutinize all aspects of those
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relationships. The subject of revolt •
12
volution is ourselves".
This scrutiny ia precisel y what lesbian
Sad0maS0ChiStS
«* -
- a boo,
6dlted
^ PUbUShed *— a iesbian-te.inist s/m
'support group', Katherine Davis writes that
We must reexamine our politicPower. The challenge ° f SSX and
explicitly about allthf
talklng Personally and
and about "how our sexualitv^ ' ^ ^
much destructive as it ifI dlffers ' ^ not so
necessary w! ^ corrective, and
-
much Is ^ we^ifwitf ^ - -ohave precisely the same h7=i ' ' " 6 must
texture of our sexuatTt,
dlalogues ab°"t the
about class^m, racism cultural ^Physical appearand Ink abUityt ^tf^'
Why must we have these dialogues, Davis explains that
anti-s/M attitudes are embedded in many areas
examrnatxon of our experience is a femin st
work,^'.V \ Th°Se ° f US wh0 have beening actively in the movement for many yearsare being labelled anti-feminist, mentally^"
or worse. Lines are being drawn and we findourselves, guite unexpectedly, on the 'other-side. We are being cast out, denied. Webecome heretics 14
.
What must be explored further is the premise,
implicit in her argument, that the answer to attitudes of
disapproval is to talk t-o «, expose oneself precisely at
that point of censurp th^oe. This premise is based on the
belief that the disagreement is a matter of i„ignorance and
fear that must be, can only be rnnnf. A±Y o , cou tered with the truth
Absent is the idea that some areas of lif.t l e may be subject
to inherent, intractable disagreement. The tenor of
Davis- remarks, and or most s/m wrltings
, ^
any disapproval, any hesitation is illegitimate and
oppressive. The celebration of individual choice, such
an important part of lpqhi^nP esb a struggle, here becomes a
demand for inclusion ini m the community on the individual's
terms
.
Community Definition and the Meaning of Feminism
To understand what is at stake in the s/m debate, we
must remember the motivations behind lesbian-feminist
theory. One of the central functions of and aims for
lesbian-feminism has been the establishment of a new
community, a new lecus for the production of meaning and
identity in the lives of lesbians. In perceiving this
need, lesbian-feminist theorists initially rebelled
against the individualism that would force each person to
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^
h6rSelf
"
iS°—
response tothe harrenness of . civilization
what Phil ip Rieff has labeUed „negative c_it^
leshian-feminists have soughfc ^ ^^
thr°U9h C—"ion of "positive communities", those
able to cure trough the achieves hy the individual
of his collective identity". 15
in distinguishing positive from negative
communities, Rieff explains that
to survive almost automatically b 'ssustarnxng technology, do not ^f%r a type ofcollective salvation, and in which the
but
r
rathe
1C
-TerienCe }f n0t transformativeo r informat ive
.
1 6
Rieff goes on to note that, while "advanced industrial
communities are no longer culturally positive", moderns
have not given up on the foundation of new positive
communities. This can be seen in the rejection by Adler
and Jung of the austere vision of Freud; it is also
prominent in Marxism. Running through modernity, as a
counterpoint to the development of science and analytic
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modes of understanding reality is t- h(aA , e constant thread of
quest for a semblance of integration in a
disintegrating world.
This same quest is evident in lesbian-feminism
***** it Presents a powerful anaiysis Qf ^
WMe
" ^ general and ^ians in particular, the
strongest appeal of lesbian-reminist thought lies in its
P-ise of a new Jerusalem beyond the diaspora of sexual
slavery. For contemporary lesbians, feminism is the
language of explanation, legiti raation, and, ultin.a-.ely,
redemption. Because gay liberation does not effectively
analyze the status of women, even those women who
identify primarily with the gay movements recognize a
debt to feminism. The nnw^r- «^ *6 P °Wer of femmism for lesbians has
lain in its ability to link an analysis of gender
oppression to critiques of the social construction of
sexuality so as to provide a new set of understandings
and meanings for lesbians.
When lesbian sadomasochists set out to discuss and
legitimate their sex, then, feminism was the language of
choice. As Amy Hoffman explains, "Lesbians who enjoy S/M
sex have spoken about their desires and fantasies in
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feminist terms because historical^ f»L ical y feminism has given
«omen a way tc analyze sex and power...17
However, the opponents of sadomasochism have denied
COnneCti°- agreeing that feminism has ,
extinctive perspective on sex and power, they argue that
that perspective is inimical to any practice that
celebrates, magnifies or \ « K a *y ues, is based upon power
differentials:
"Whatever the pa„«c use, the acting out of
sadomasochistic desires ^ , «.163 13 cont"ry to feminism, just as
dominant/submissive role m fltf<ne playi g outside the bedroom is
contrary to feminism. "18
When two seemingly contradictory positions such as
these claim the same authority, it bec0mes clear that the
confusion is not simply over the issue that is being
discussed, but rather is concerned with the basic terms
of the argument. What i<? ar ch =u •i 1S t stake is, not simply the
evaluation of a particular Qnr-+-sort of sexual activity, but
the meaning of 'feminism' itself.
This has been the nature of 'feminism' since its
inception. In its adoption by adherents of different
theories and commitments, it has meant slightly different
things to each person. This confusion is due to the
'essentially contested' nature of feminism's central
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values. as a theory of women's oppression ,, feminism has
—ys pointed toward some non_oppressive possibiiity _
ar9USd^ that ^ «**!.. is inevitable
, in
that
"contemporary ferainists necessarily ^ ^ ^
-terest o f their predecessors in freedom,
equality,.19 Because these values are central to
feminism, feminists cannot avoid the controve •^ un rsies and
struggles that have always surrounded them.
The issue of sadomasochism has become a central
forum for debate over these va]„«lues within the lesbian-
feminist community. Bat-Ami Bar On explains:
an
e
iss
r
ue
Ct
for £L
Sadoma
f
°
ChlSm haS SUrfac^ "f
,
t the women's community becau^ it-
sexual
fragmented ^ist lessons about '1 repression and sexual abuse intoSoS r SaCh n °ther - • • • the feministstruggle for sexual liberation has becomepolarrzed with the struggle to end sexualviolence and domination. Each debating party
thouah
0
?/
0
"
an°ther feminist lesson as
knowLdge20
nC°mPaSSed aU the" " to feminist
What are these lessons? They revolve around notions
of freedom and the status of consciousness. While many
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f6miniStS
"
0Uld ^ ™-r.a Reimoldt that
women to self-determination"21 thg _f ne nature of self-
determinatl°n iS
— struggle for sexual
and lesbian feminism, led many women ^ ^ ^
sexuality as the bedrocx of oppression and tree.om.
Within this struggle, the centraln value was choice - the
real ability to choose the uses of one's body, for
3 Uberal
view of persons and society
as describe, in Chapter One. Adhe rents of this view have
translated self-determination into the ability to do
"'right as us lest' << just as we please',." The „ slmple
command of the Goddess" that they see as the heart of
feminism is, »'So that you harm no one, do what you
will.' "22 Such women pos . t a connect . on befcween t^
oppression of gays and lesbians and that of unsatisfied
or abused heterosexual women on the basis of the
repression of desire in service to patriarchal, sexist
imperatives. In opposition to these demand s, they have
"insisted on the importance of subjectivity - how it
feels to be oppressed, the truth about women's individual
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UVM
'
°ur feelin9S
'
th« s
< «»s
, pains and
pleasures . "23
Centring in this understanding Qf
sadomasochists have argued for the primacy of
subjectivity within feminism
. Thgy ^^ ^
they should not be inciuded within the feminist
community, with their understanding Qf^^
practices as definitive; contemporary iesbians and gays
do not accede to heterosexual demands that they renounce
°r hide their sexuality, but rather have advanced new
interpretations of that sexuality as superior to that of
the psychiatric, legal, and religious authorities who had
dominated the debate. The central claim of feminism,
they argue, has been the superiority of the individual
woman's understanding and interpretation of her
experience and desire. To repudiate this by condemning
sadomasochism and denying its practitioners full
membership within the lesbian-feminist community is to
repeat the oppression of gays that is validated by
medicine and religion.
This simple view of sexual choice has come under
scrutiny as women began to focus, not on the need for
pleasure, but on the reality of danger, and the need to
~ lt . Theorists such ^ susan firownmUier< ^
fin
' Kathleen
— -— oworkin elaborated onthe network of fear and domination ^
sexual lives and th», in a society which sees women
as well as pr ivate . Ihis trend ^ lesbian _ feminism
focussed, not on pleasure h„f „P , but on power, arguing that
"true sexual freedom win be possible Qnly^ ^^
the connection between sex and power, when there is no
Power component in sexual interactions. -24 By , power ,,
they mean not only force but- a n «-uy u^e, o t ll the mechanisms of
control and domination that lead women to narrow their
choices, to see as desirable that which is against their
interests, to substitute the imperatives of men for their
own desires. Sadomasochism, with its polarization of
roles and its celebration of inequality, appears to be
the epitome of the sex/power relation, and thus
complicitous in the continuance of women's oppression.
In response to this, sadomasochists have argued
along two lines. The first suggests that power is what
we make of it; that is, that one cannot infer from the
express words and actions of the participants what the
meaning and valence of the exchange may be. Thus, a
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=onSensual s/m encm
^ ^bating or actual degradation, and Qf ^
«- two situations ls actuaUy contradictor^ ^
argUmSnt
'
hOWSVer
' —— ^ i. the suggestion
t^t power is an inevitable component ^^
and thus that acknowledgment and proper use Qf^ ^ &
more vi able, more 'feminist' =,* .strategy than the denial of
an power relations. The earlier lesbian-feminist vision
of female purity has given way to an acceptanoe of the
conflicts and imperfections even among • woman-identified
women'
.
This difference in theoretical understanding i s
outstanding in the writings of the two camps in the
sadomasochism battle. The shared meanings of words such
as oppression, alienation, and freedom within early
lesbian-feminism have broken down as the two concerns of
sexual pleasure and sexual danger have diverged. The
language of pleasure is necessarily based on the
perceptions and feelings of the individual; the
enunciation of danger has been forced to transcend, often
to contradict, those perceptions and feelings. Still
agreed on the basic premise that lesbian oppression is
the result of the oppression of women, and thus that
136
si^.cant analysis must revoive ^
9endSr
'
tW
°^ « adumbrating notions of
oppression and freedom that directly oppose
_^
These notions in turn r«test on contradictory conceptions
of the self and its constitution that reflect the
disputing intultions of modern teerieans ^
in rejecting the analysis of the sadomasochists
their opponents had to chailenge first of ail the
sovereignty of subjectivity
. While one , s thoughts ^
feelings were essential, they argued, a social theory
-st be able to go beyond, to explain and critigue those
thoughts and feelings. Their criticise of the simp ie
focus on subjectivity have been those made by Brian Pay
of simple interpretive social science. In Sggi^^
^^ii^i-^otice- he argues that the necessary
reference to individual meanings and understandings
cannot be a sufficient basis for unraveling social
systems, (cite) His objections to simple interpretation
are four: first, as he says, "such a social science
leaves no room for an examination of the conditions which
give rise to the actions, rules and beliefs which it
seeks to explicate, and, more particularly, it does not
provide a means whereby one can study the relationships
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b6tWeen
"-"^— °f a social order and the
Possible forms of behaviour and beiiefs which s^
elements engender . "25 SeconH e ud, such an interpretation
cannot account for, or even discuss »t-h« *bCUSS
'
he pattern of
unintended consequences of actions-26, since/ it cannot
refer beyond the intentions and expectations of the
agents. A third problem with this model is that it
"Provides no way for the social scientist to understand
structural conflict within a society, that is, it offers
no
.ethod of analysing the contradictions which might
exist between certain actions, rules, and co-on
meanings, or between these and their causes or
results. "27 flnd finally
, Qne must gQ ^
understandings of the participants if one is to explain
historical change. All of these elements are necessary
if we are to truly have a theory; and, without a theory,
we find ourselves mere curators of the past and present,
antiquarians of ourselves. A central element in the
anti-sadomasochism arguments has been the insistence on
going beyond the self-understandings of the participants
in a sexual encounter in order to grasp the 'constitutive
meanings' that construct the encounter and infuse it with
-i O O
value .28
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in stressing subjectivity,
sadomasochists are
responding to the imposition of identitvy and history upon
lesbians that has been effected by psychoanaiysis, by
-ligious dogma
,
and by phiiosophers, as well as by the
state. This imposition has been cQntinued^ ^ t^
service of feminism by the construction of standards of
membership and explanations of lesbian „< ,o existence and
identity within the lchian r~ •n lesbian-feminist community, as seen
in Chapter Three. Further, the insistence on public
discussion of issues earlier considered private mandated
that sadomasochists talk about what they did. As
sadomasochists found themselves outside of the boundaries
of their new community, they fell back on what seemed
certain and real
- their bodies, their pleasures and
desires, and their honest thoughts.
In justifying these pleasures and desires to a
hostile audience, lesbian sadomasochists have relied
centrally on the fact that their sexual relations are
consensual, that they are not instances of violence and
abuse because they are freely chosen and because it is
understood that the masochist always has the option to
stop and to define what may be done. It is also argued
as a result of this that what is going on may be best
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understood in terms of pi av of iP ay, imagination and fantasy
rather than 'reality'. No onpy e, they argue, has a right
to limit another's consensual sex, and no one has the
-hority to portray their activity as violence or a.use
because they faU to understand the drama involved.
Alienation and Authenticity
^e rejection of these arguments has been the basis
of extensive writing about the limitations of liberalism.
The leading opponents of sadomasochism are primarily
academics, either teachers of philosophy and women's
studies or graduate students, and their education has
included the history of political thought. They are
uniformly contemptuous of consent arguments made within a
'patriarchal' society, denying that such a society
affords the possibility for meaningful choice. Jan
Raymond argues that "consent to so-called lesbian
sadomasochism can derive its 'meaning' only from their
status as victimized peers, one of whom merely role-plays
the part of the powerful"29. And Robin Ruth Linden
suggests that "the psychological reality of 'consensual'
sadomasochism is so abstracted from the actual social and
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historical conditions that shanP hpe human relationships and
6r0tlC deSirS aS t0 be virtually meaningless-30.
These women also reject arguments about P iay and
fantasy, on two grounds. The fir^f ™- i.6 tl st Point, presented most
cogently by Susan Leigh Star i, t-wy ^ar, s hat we are in fact
unable to choose our contexts and meanings as we might
fancy, and that to imagine that we can is toud engage in
'objective idealism' 31. The sec-mH =in ond argument, made by
Julia Penelope and cited by many others, is that
fantasies per se are anti-feminist;
"the more we rely on
internal fantasies during our interactions with other
wimmin (sic)", she qav? i
,
n s ys, the less we are relating to
each other as wimmin." Thiq nr-rVh-i kj «- amis prohibition extends even to
ourselves; "To the extent that we rely on fantasies for
eur masturbation, we have objectified our own sexual
feelings." And Audre Lorde rejects the appeal to play in
terms consistent with those used for pornography when she
says that "even in p !a y , to affirm that the exertion of
power over powerlessness is erotic, is empowering, is to
set the emotional and social stage for the continuation
of that relationship, politically, socially and
economically. "32 Thus, in a replay of the debates over
pornography, the fantasy argument is considered defective
both because of lts attempt ^ , compartmentaiization< ^
dSSlre ^ ° f intrinsically degradlng ,
nature of fantasy. Fantasv it- •y- r y, it ls charged, is
incompatible with authenticity, with the integrity Qf ^
conflict within oneself is not a matter Qf ^
able, tragic nature of life t-h^ „•r t that gives rise to politics;
it is, rather, a sign of sickness, a wound within the
self to be healed. To be authentic- to be a person - is
to maintain a unity between consciousness and desire,
reason and will and appetite; and for such a one, to
tolerate the diversity implicit in politics is to sin.
When he suggests that "authenticity is implicitly a
polemical concept, fulfilling its nature by dealing
aggressively with received and habitual opinion"33,
Lionel Trilling points to a recurring problem for ideals
of authentic personhood. These ideals serve, not so much
to tell us how to live, as to condemn the ways that we do
live without guiding us in transformation. To be
authentic is to be real - but how are we to know what is
real? The sadomasochists argue that they are being real,
they are being true to themselves rather than repressing
real desires. In order to respond to this, their
opponents have had to portray these desires as
^authentic, as a slippage fr0m personhood that must he
conquered. Thus, when Rohin Ruth Linden says that
"sadomasochism is firmiy rooted in patriarchal sexual
ideology, with its emphasis on the fragmentaticn of
pursuit of gratification", she must conclude that "the
recent interest by some women in sadomasochism is
testimony to the profoundly alienated and objectified
conceptions of erotic desire"34 with which we arg aU
burdened. To be a woman and to do or desire these things
is so clearly contradictory as to obviate any further
discussion. m fact, further discussion is impossible,
except among those who already share the premises; the
notion of authenticity is vague enough to provide no
basis for argument between- the truly opposed. It is
particularly unpersuasive to those being called
inauthentic; the elegant prose of alienation and
objectification has been paraphrased by Johanna Reimoldt
as "the argument of the Idiot-Woman", who "cannot sanely
choose because she has been too warped and brainwashed by
her society, poor thing, to know what she's doing. The
fact that she is so warped is in turn proved by the fact
that she has chosen this behavior". 35
in rejecting the argents or the sadomasochists,
radical lesbian-feminist writers have identified
liberalism with the arguments made, to the point of
suggesting that sadomasochism »is not a deviation from
the philosophical origins of liberalism but a
realization of them "36 Th ,._ .is is so both because of
liberalism's tendency to abst-raot- „». •st ct choice from the actual
social context, and because of the utilitarian liberal's
focus on individual happiness, which they identify with
callousness. Not only do they have the right to define
sadomasochism as violence, they have the obligation to
demystify it, to "place responsibility on the aggressor,
thus allowing women's experience to be named, described,
and acted upon"37 #
Lesbian-feminists who object to sadomasochism are
now facing the charge of narrow-minded arrogance, and are
using all the theoretical equipment of the Hegelian
revolution to counter it. Refusing to rest with medical
or other judgments that have traditionally included
lesbianism on the list of pathologies, these writers have
had to formulate arguments out of what they perceive as
the ground of feminism. At every point, however, they
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a- faced with the challengg fco^ ^
arguments from the , mystificatiQns , ^ , ideologies , Qf
those who have considered them deviant
. point
about the unknown background tQ My desire ^
^ use. as effectively against lesbians in general as
against sadomasochists (or heteroses,,,
i
uKL rosexuai women, those
other
-victims' of patriarch,)
. In using the
for our iarger good, the lesbian-feminist must explain
why lesbianism is not one of those choices that must be
renounced. m turn, sadomasochists must be challenged to
describe more fully how a libertarian position can deal
with issues of social and sexual power abuse. An extreme
position may offer the comfort of consistency, but in
this case it seems to lead to the elimination of the
possibility of community in the search for pleasure. The
dilemma of a situated, non-alienated freedom is what the
issue of sadomasochism has brought to the fore, and no
simple response will do it justice.
145
Conclusion
What, then, are we to make of the sadomasochism
debate, Is lt
, as Kathleen^ ^ ^
suggested, a ploy of the left- t-„n ft o weaken radical feminism
from within? i s it *q t-ho 1 u-, as he lesbian-feminist
sadomasochists would have it-V
^
ust another frontier in
the battle for liberation from ignorance ana intolerance
another newly freed field for dialogue and understanding?
Or is it, indeed, a child of lesbian-feminism, but a
child of its defects rather than strengths?
The arguments of the sadomasochists are,
indeed, largely liberal material; underneath the talk of
community, the language of radical analysis and
redemption, lies the Hobbesian acceptance of power and
the Lockean focus on contract as the ground of human
relations. In their talk of sexual 'exchanges' and
'encounters' bereft of any context, the sadomasochists
are indeed guilty of, not only objective idealism, but a
denial of the reality of any community underlying
political structures. Or perhaps, not a denial, so much
as a failure to understand; one can easily imagine these
writers to be ignorant both of social theory and of the
force of affectinnsisectio al, community ties in •y m their own lives
«= is this failure that makes them ^
opponents, who identify such naivete^
And yet, this is not a naive liberalism. Rather
,
what seems to be occurring is a „"n recognition of the price
"
Sil"Ple
' I*""*""*' unity, and a determination to
maintain a core of autonomy beyond sociai deconstructs
and reconstruction. The tot alist impuise in lesbian-
feminism, that which seeks to explain and prescribe ever,
aspect of life, is being answered< ^ by
counter-explanation, but by a refusal to explain, to
allow oneself to be explained. The high walls of privacy
being built by the sadomasochists serve to insulate, not
merely against the state or male society, but against
interpretation. »I am what I say I am", they say; not
because they reject the possibility of a hermeneutic of
consciousness and sexuality, but because they distrust
the effect of any such hermeneutic.
The sadomasochists have grown up within lesbian-
feminism, and have participated in discussion and
activities which have exposed liberalism to the light,
which have questioned the smooth surface of consent and
choice, the lines between public and private. They know
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that the surface and the lines of our^ _ ^
not, they would not treat social ostracism as
to poX itical oppression
_ BQth sides offer ^^^^^ ^
equipped to provide superior understandings of
heterosexuality, of 'patriarchy
, 0 f men and
'
U1 women. How
then, can the sadomasochists refuse an authority beyond
Objectivity in the one privileged area of lesbian
sadomasochism And how can their opponents back away
from the full implications of their critigue? Are both
sides, perhaps, merely hiding behind a liberalism they do
not believe, as Glenn Tinder has suggested of students in
the 1960's who retreatPd "t-r, nv,6 e t0 liberal breastworks when
confronted with rnnwrw.t-^n conservative opponents who understood the
significance of their styles"38 ?
While the privatized, often hyper-individualist
arguments of the sadomasochists are not the product of
feminism as much as a general legacy of Americans, what
is clear is that lesbian-feminism does mandate a sort of
self-exposure, as well as the sense that one's life must
be lived as a whole, either good or bad, either for
freedom or against. With this sort of pressure,
sadomasochists have cooperated both in talking about a
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lr
ian-
about, and in feeling
'oppressed when others^ ^
dlSPlSaSUre
-
F°r in
* "„ht community such as leso
feminism has developed in the past, disapproval does
indeed amount to exoommunioation
. The normalsm rmalizing aim of
confession works precisely by calling to li ght that which
has been hidden, and then chasing it, rooting it out, and
returning to chec* on it. in the first years of lesbian-
feminism, that strategy was effective; hut the charges of
parochialism that surfaced from women of color, from
lower-class women, and from <pre-feminist" lesbians have
left an opening for others to rebel ac^inct- ^o i gainst the judgment
that follows upon confession.
Any change in the situation will take time, if it
comes at all. Behind the debate among lesbians lurk
always the facts of continued governmental persecution or
lack of protection of gay men and women in many areas,
which make unity seem so essential. Rubin has said that
"the real danger is not that S/M lesbians will be made
uncomfortable in the women's movement. The real danger
is that the right, the religious fanatics, and the right-
controlled state will eat us all alive. "39 it is this
awareness that makes sadomasochists clamor for inclusion;
149
it is this that makes them so dangerous to feminists who
do not want any association with them
. whether open
-elusion of sadomasochists and their demands „m ^
or heip feminism cannot be foreseen; what is certain
however, is that simple rejection and silencing is no
longer available to those lesbian-feminists who want s/m
to disappear. Further, attempts to do so can only be
based on the weakest, least thoughtful aspects of
lesbian-feminism. This prospect should at least give
feminists pause.
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CHAPTER FIVE
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITY
"Before I compliment either a m*n rt u>
substituted for ?hem?» °"
What they have
-John Stuart Mill
What, finally, are we to make of lesbian-feminism,
How raight the develops of lesbian-fe rainist theory and
its particular issues illuminate the problems of society
and politics? Does analysis of this development shed any
light on the fortunes and misfortunes of liberalism?
What is to be gained by reading lesbian-feminism as
political theory?
The first lesson we can learn from lesbian-feminism
is the extent to which relations of power manifest
themselves in and through language. The struggles for a
positive self-understanding and a sense of historical
community have been conducted as a struggle to re-define
and re-describe lesbians and lesbianism. This process
has been at least partially self-conscious. When gays
and lesbians rejected psychoanalysis as the relevant
discourse for their identities, they did so not because
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psychoanalysts opposed their political o •r civil liberty
(though some did oppose iti w uPP° ), but because they believed
that psychoanalysis was incapable of expressing a
conception of their lives that did justice to their
agency and dignity, whatever Freud's own opinions may
have been, his discourse has operated as one of the
paramount
'individualizing' forces in 20th century
^erica. The simple liberalism of the American psycho-
analysts could be seen to function, not as a liberatory
force, but as a blind behind which power could move
freely into the bodies and minds of a deviant population.
As a discourse of laws and sovereignty, liberalism could
not address the dangers posed by a normalizing discipline
such as psychoanalysis; liberal justice has been too
strongly wedded to juridical theory to (adequately)
account for the problems of inclusion and dignity. it is
this narrowness, and these problems, that have n>ade
liberalism so unpalatable to the taste of many moderns.
The relation of power to language is not unique to
psychoanalysis, however. The development of lesbian-
feminism is a story of the conscious use of language as a
weapon in struggle. This, then, is our second theme:
identity formation, inevitably bound as it is to the
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location of community membership, is , raatter ^ ^
ontology but also of ^
^
lesbian identity has appeared ^ ^ ^ ^
^
.
1SVel
" Phll ° S— i argument
. But tMs phiiosQphy
has arisen from and must be geared to th„y a e concrete needs
of lesbians. Arguments and deflnitlons afe ^
"ith
^ t0 ete™al than with a view toward
their concrete implications for community membership and
political strategy. The formatlon Qf g ,
identity' was achieved, first, through the norma i izing
influence of psychiatry in the last century, and then
through the development of a gay and lesbian urban
subculture in the 20th century. 1 The re-formation of
that identity under lesbian- feminism has been argued for
in terms of truth. But in fact the issue has been power;
or, rather, the issue has been truth and power.
2
The first choice in the new strategy was the rejec-
tion of psychoanalysis; the second was the decision to
ally with feminists rather than gay men. The result of
these two moves, first seen in "The Woman-Identified
Woman", was the production of a new truth about lesbians
- the truth that lesbianism is a matter of politics, of
rebellion, of love for women in a misogynist world. This
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truth simultaneously reflected fche ^ ^^
lesbians and structured ^^ ^ ^ ^
^ latSr think" S
'
C— 1 or rigorous, about what their
difference
'meant'
.
The guest to get at the meaning of Xesbianism
reflects the continuing reificatinn ^ i wy t mcatio of lesbian lives
under the sway of lesbian-feminism. After rejecting
liberalism for lt8 obliviousness fco questiQns ^
identity and power
, lesblans some ^ cia^
right to exist. Under the sway of the modern belief that
actions are systematic of being
, these woraen^ ^
search for their essenoe end its meaning. Because their
oppression had been located" around their choice of women,
it seemed obvious that this choice was what needed
legitimation
.
The result, however, was dismaying, m constructing
the new lesbian, lesbian-feminists did not deal with the
problem of difference. Rather, they erased it by
valorizing and moralizing lesbian sex. The conjunction
of lesbianism and radic a l feminism resulted in a new
understanding of what lesbianism was about, what women
were like, and what and who the problems were. Confident
in their status as victims/survivors/resisters of
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Patriarchy, lesbian-feminists brushed aside the self-
understandings of other lesbians as • male-identified-
structured by power rather than informed by truth.
At this point, the issue of lesbian sadomasochism
came to expose two problem areas for lesbian-feminism
first is the problem of difference, particularly
sexual difference, and the second is the question of
speech. The confident distinction between truth/freedom
on the one hand, and power, on the other, associating
truth with speech and power with silence, led to the
belief that freedom simply requ ired speaking the truth
about oneself, thus breaking the wall of silence and
repression that was seen as central to lesbian (and
women's) oppression. This belief was bolstered by the
reification of the lesbian, which ensured that any words
spoken, particularly about sexuality and desire, would be
liberatory and empowering, when lesbian sadomasochists
began to speak, however, those lesbians who did not
approve could find no room within feminism for their
inclusion. Neither could they tell them not to speak
without becoming the new oppressors. The totalizing
nature of radical lesbian-feminist thought guaranteed
that some group would pose such a challenge. And that
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same nature ensured that the response would be made in
another normalizing depth-language, as insidious as the
one they had fought to escape. The political lesson we
us is not one of doctrine nor of behavior, but more
fundamentally of the impulse to totalization, to
power/knowledge, that is endemic to modernity.
For it is clear that these problems - of identity
formation and community location, of the relations
between language and power, and of the threat posed by
modern discourse in all its varieties - are the problems
facing all contemporary thinkers in the West. Lesbian-
feminism is often deceptive' on this point, because a
fundamental belief of most of the prominent theorists is
that they are doing something new, something unique,
something totally at odds with 'male' history and
philosophy. The belief in an ontological difference and
opposition between men and women leads them to ignore or
deny their common involvement with non-feminist thinkers.
What we are witnessing in lesbian-feminism is a new
Enlightenment, another attempt to make words mean what we
want them to mean and to shed the confusion and evil of
the past. It is crucial, then, that we heed the lesson
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°f that earlier Enlightenment, and not take this one
solely at its word.
The Status of the Subject
One of the persisting problem for liberalism has
been its inability to relate its ideals of liberty,
tolerance and dignity to the real decisions and policies
of co-o„ life. The level of abstract . on requ . red ^
maintain a consistent stance of liberalism renders one
either isolated from others in the attempt to 'live one's
principles' or forced to explain the variety of
exceptions and gualifications of the principles that
arise in everyday life with actual others. Neither Kant
nor the British liberals ended up with an actual defense
of individual diversity; liberty and dignity depended
upon meeting the requirements of rationality in one's
being and privacy in one's actions. As Michel Foucault
has pointed out, the central values of the Enlightenment
required the discipline and self-discipline of the
rational subject. It was only the peculiar internal
discipline of the subject that made external, political
and civil liberty consistent with the demands of social
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oration. It was the valori2atiQn ^ ^
such liberty that bllnded lndivlduais ^ price
^ subjection to the disciplines required in modern
schools, factories, and corporations .
3
wmia„ Connolly has examined Foucault's work on the
modern construction of a disciplined subject as a
counterpoint to the Enlightenment vision of "the free,
rational and responsible agent capable of consenting
'
freely to rules, of being guided by long-term interests
and principles, and of being punished for deviation from
those norms to which it has voluntarily consented. ..4 The
conclusion that he draws, however, is not that we must
immediately reject the subject and subject-centered
morality. He argues that, disciplined as moderns may be,
"those who have experienced the affirmative side of
modern freedom, self-consciousness and citizenship (the
subject at the level of political life)
, invariably seek
to retain and extend this experience . "5 His point is
that, suspect as modern disciplines may be, their
positive side is such that even those who feel the
subjection are reluctant to reject the positive in order
to eliminate the negative. We cannot hope merely to
erase the modern self in favor of some more 'authentic',
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less disciplined being. „ we acknowledge ^ ^
order is essential, and inevitable, then "the development
of a subject-centered morality may turn out, when
compared to other conceivable alternatives, to be the
-st saiutary way to foster order through the consent and
endorsement of participants. "6
The long-term project, then, is to reconstitute the
subject in a less extreme, bifurcated manner; it is to
understand the subject so as to "enable us to acknowledge
•
•
-others", as Steven White says. 7 The force of work
such as that of Foucault and the deconstructionists lies
in the appeal to otherness, to the desire to re-open the
world and its possibilities. Such a desire, however,
often falls short in action. Aanathematizing closure,
the deconstructionist finds herself unable to bear
drawing lines that she knows to be 'fictive'8. white
notes that feminism is a particularly active ground for
this problem. The reason for this, he says, is "that
while, on the one hand, post-structuralism's emphasis on
otherness is seen by feminists to be salutary, on the
other hand, they, perhaps more than most others
influenced by post-structuralism, feel the pull of the
responsibility to act in an especially acute way." 9
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Lesbian-feminism certainly has^^
The most powerful insights of lesbian . feminism
centered around the myriad and sufatle ^ ^ ^ ^
constructed, our potential perversities smoothed a„ay;
the best, early work of Mary Daly and Adrienne Rich are
particularly strong examples. However, this project of
uncovering and questioning, which has opened the doors to
positive identity for many lesbians, has continually
fallen prey to the closure necessitated by the attempt to
construct a new community and a new history.
in this closure, many lesbian-feminists have shared
the path of those modern communitarians who feel the
urgency of the need to combat social disintegration and
its resultant violence. The communitarian argument has
centered around the flimsiness, the unearthly
abstraction, of the liberal self, and Maclntyre, Taylor
and Sandel have attempted to portray a 'thicker',
'situated' self that resides inescapably in language and
social structures. The implication of their work has
been that this situated self, resting on understandings
and structures that bind us together below the level of
self-consciousness, provide a better ground for
discussing political claims and obligations than does the
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it is
rational self of contract theory Tho «-. e motivation of
liberalism's opponents is a better n fflwtiLt li e on earth-
the justification of substantive sociai ^
action. The rejectlon Qf liberaiigm is fche re . ection Qf
a skeleton, an empty frame of societv tw^u ny hat cannot serve
as the basis for any suoh substantive claim.
The experience of lesbian-feminism, however, can
Provide us with clues tQ the endurance ^ skeieton
of justice. The resilience of liberalism is due
fundamentally to its commitment to the preservation of
the 'affirmative side' of the modern subject. "The
elements particular to modernity may in principle be
contestable", Connolly tells us- "hm- n,„y , put these are contests
we are not now in a position to open. "10 Given our
limited horizon, given our present constitution as
independent subjects and the self-understandings that
accord with that constitution, liberalism stands alone in
its commitment to individual rights and tolerance of
diversity. Communitarianism, both left and right, is
constantly pressed to reconcile itself to the premise of
individualism so powerful in the United States. Even as
they challenge liberalism, American social movements draw
on the strength of the liberal appeal to rights and
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autonomy. Those wh0 appeal to othgr traditiMs a^ often
moving, their voices a powerful oonstrast to the
degenerate forms of individualism to whioh Merican
society is increasingly susceptible. And yet they cannot
entirely dispense with liberal ideals without appearing
to exercise a moral judgment necessarily suspect.
Whatever leading theoreticians may believe, many feminist
lesbians apparently understand their position and aims in
essentially liberal terms
, and they^ ^ ^
so as long as the concern for individual determination
and rights predominates over that of community and order.
in the United States, the civic republican
tradition has always been challenged by the fear that
republicans will not act to protect the minority. Every
'consensus' has been haunted by the suspicion that it is
incomplete, perhaps even coercive. Called upon to
justify their concern in an age increasingly insecure in
its metaphysics, liberals such as Rawls returned to Kant
and contract theory to draw the lines of justice. As we
see metaphysics replaced by linguistics and history, the
grounds of contract theory erode once again. The
liberal concern, however, lives on, and is fueled by
post-structuralist thought. Perhaps, after all,
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Maclntyre is right when he casts liberals as covert
Nietzscheans (though Nietzsche is still no liberal), at
least in the sense that liberals cannot believe in the
community (whether linguistic, political, or otherwise-
based) sufficiently to turn themselves over to it
completely. m the splintering of modernity, the
liberal has always been the one to enlarge the cracks in
the seemingly smooth walls of community. One cannot be
both a genealogist and a metaphysician; one cannot
deconstruct and remain a communitarian in the way one was
before. As Connolly explains, "genealogy is a
radicalization... concentrating on the 'strategies' of
power which establish and maintain the most basic unities
of modernity while suspending any appeal to rationality
or truth to understand these constructions . "H
In its current version, liberalism rests upon the
construction of a person who has no characteristics that
are of public concern beyond those necessary for keeping
the peace. As Michael Sandel has put it, this liberal
self is "prior to its ends" and "prior to its roles and
dispositions", thus assuring "its independence from
social conventions, and hence its separateness of person,
its individuality". 12 Maclntyre contrasts this to what
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^ calls a "narrative conception of the self", that is
,
"a self constituted in part by a life story with a
certain teles". MacXntyre's conception (as well as those
of Sandel and Charles Taylor) does indeed see, richer and
USefUl f° r standing actual humans than does the
thin liberal self. Yet
, this is only one among several
Possibilities. Another choice could be that between the
narrative self and the constructed subject of Foucault.
This is perhaps the more relevant battle ground in
current theory. Both concepts are historically rich,
capable of situating persons in actual social
circumstances and discussing them on the level of
expressed self-understandings and aspirations. The two
approaches are directly opposed, however, in their
evaluation of those understandings.
The narrative self, as described by Maclntyre, is
that self which is inevitably located in a particular
social and historical space which gives the meaning to
her thoughts, choices, and actions. The aim of his
conception is to make sense of the life of an individual.
In contrast, Foucault' s constructed subject is the
creature, not of sense, but of power. His genealogies of
social institutions deprive the subject of any capacity
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to justify and explain itself and the rel.ru Ln ations which
form it.
The narrative self is bound to ^ ^ ^
^- But this is not the charge tQ be ^
by Post-structuralists, for any constructed, non-
transcendental self shares this same limitation. The
Problem with the conception of a narrative or expressive
self is that it Mocks critique even within those
horizons. This self is treated as independent of power
relations, because the fact of construction is not taken
seriously enough. The acknowledgement that we are
constituted, which is the first step away from an
atomistic liberalism, must be followed by the question:
by what or whom are we so built? The answer,
'language',
or 'culture', or 'tradition', is hardy an answer unlesg
it is followed by more questions: Who controls the
language, culture, and tradition? What interests and
purposes are served by the present constitution of the
self? The theorists of an expressive self decline to
answer these questions. Contrasting the projects of
Taylor and Foucault, Michael Shapiro says that
"Taylor's perspective would close questions
that Foucault' s analysis opens up. Operating
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within a notion of discourse. =<-
what is fundamental i^K expressive of
would endorse the sel? ™2 h™an ' Taylor
lent^^hereas^c^ft^^refLt: h^ ^have been given this self -13 lnt ° ow we
SimUarly
'
^^yre's narrative self is a useful
contrast to the abstract,
'thin' self of liberal theory.
But it too fails to answer our needs today. m his
return to a vocabulary of tradition and community,
Maclntyre is forced to continue the search for the good
as something transcending particularities . ^ Not only is
he unable to ask the questions concerning power and the
self, he is unwilling, for it is precisely against those
questions that he is arguing. His whole project is aimed
at throwing a veil over the Enlightenment, asking us to
behave as though it had never happened. Specifically,
Maclntyre hopes to derail the nihilism that he blames for
modern bureaucratic domination.
Perhaps it is the facts of Maclntyre' s own existence
that account for this. Certainly, bureaucratic
domination and the irrational violence that is its twin
are major problems for modernity. However, he overlooks
the fact that many humans today can only locate a
tradition and a community by denying themselves a
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language, a spouse, or otherwi v>^«se hiding themselves. We
=omfortable with Madntyre's soothing words of conver .
sation and oonfiict within tradition. Those who have
never been aliowed in any community or tradition in the
first place may reasonably be even more doubtful.
Power and Community
It is this abiding skepticism that fuels liberalism.
Far from being a doctrine of progress, liberalism was, as
Sheldon Wolin tells us, "a philosophy of sobriety, born
in fear, nourished by disenchantment, and prone to
believe that the human condition was and was likely to
remain one of pain and anxiety. "15 The product Qf
religious war, liberalism is the true political theory of
the analytic of finitude." its birth presumed two
things. First, the eternal truth of God's will was not
manifestly evident to humans in any publicly accessible
way. Second, relations on earth are relations of power
and utility as well as love, that, indeed, we are
afforded no certain basis for distinguishing love from
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Power or utility beyond our oonscious, conscientious
subjectivity.
Behind the communitarianism of both right and left
lies the belief that power is opposed to love and com-
™ S 1S
-
ident
-
the writings of radical
feminists (indeed, most feminists)
, as well as in the
work of Taylor and Maclntyre. m contrasting (good,
community and (bad, power, communitarians have sought to
relocate the grounds of community as a way to oppose
power; or, rather, they have opposed power in order to
establish community.
in contrast, liberals and post-structuralists have
both stressed the extent to which community is a vehicle
of power. This power operates precisely through the
codes that the community endorses, the codes that define
identity and action, and it is irremovable from them. if
this is so, then the question becomes not how to remove
power but how to live with it; not what power is
transcendentally legitimate, but rather, what power is
necessary for what purposes. The liberal focus on
justice and rights is the approximation of these ques-
tions. Denying any claim to know the good, liberals have
nonetheless been sufficiently moved by the claims of
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metaphysics to try to establish a transcendental standard
of justice in a hostile environment.
What liberalism promises, then, is a possible line
of defense for human dignity in the face of totalizing or
normalizing discourse. However, contemporary liberals
are mistaken as to the source of this defense which has
never, and will never find a sufficient motive in logic
and analysis. What is precious, what is needed is the
liberal sentient, that which appreciates, even enjoys,
the ambiguity and contestation of public life. The
bearer of such a sentiment need not abstract from the
particulars of my existence to respect me; neither must
she agree that my understanding of a good life is the
true, the best, the purest. What she need do is believe
that I mean what I say; that is, she must agree to treat
me as a being competent to speak of my own desires and
motives directly (even if she suspects that I am not)
.
The x truth' of psychological theories of self-
construction cannot be sufficient grounds for the
hegemony of these discourses and explanations. Once we
acknowledge the extent to which discourses of depth
structure function as vehicles of power, we can once
again attempt to draw a line between the truth-status of
a description and its impllcit demands Qn policy
_ ^
awareness that I ara neurotic or unaware of my oppression
or in other ways 'defective' should not be allowed to
function as a reason to ignore or denigrate my self-
understandings and desires.
As they began, lesbian-feminists fought to wrest the
understandings and construction of lesbian identity from
the grip of those who denigrated the self-understandings
of lesbian women. m the process, however, they fell
into the trap awaiting all moderns, all subjects of the
regime of truth; the trap of counter-reification, of
justifying their existence by reference to (new)
transcendental standards of what a lesbian is, what she
means, and where she fits. But lesbians are not the only
ones for whom this trap las lain in wait. The first
victims, not surprisingly, were the white bourgeois men
who sought a justification in truth for liberal theory.
The initial argument of liberalism relied on a
constructed man, a being with powers of reason and a
propensity for unreasonableness that sanctioned his
inclusion in public affairs along clearly defined,
neutralized lines. Those who did not fit the criteria
simply did not have any place in public life.
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The primary challenge to liberai ^
(reasoneble, iiberel man
. The communitarian ^
been to find what people actually ate like, as a way of
discovering what we are actually cue. The struggles of
lesbians over the past thirty years, however, should tell
us that
-peopie' are not 'actually like- any^; and
that the experience of oppression has less to do with
"hat we are told we are like than it does with the
rigidity with which we are told what we are like, what we
mean, and how we should manifest that meaning. The
opposite of oppression in this sense is, not truth or
respect, but humor or llghtheertedness - the humor that
comes from seeing all categories, all explanations, all
identities as provisional. Such a sense is rooted in the
appreciation of ambiguity that is antithetical to all
metaphysics, including 'liberatory' metaphysics."
A strong implication of this dissertation has been
the idea that the truths of our lives are not to be found
(exclusively) in our self-representations. By this I
mean that not only do we not understand the consequences
of our generalized statements, but we do not in fact live
the lives that our theoretic representations would
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SU996st
-
Far from bei
- * —ss, this is
, rather/ the
strength of human life exceeding verbali 2ation. It has
been acknowledged in . partial way fay those^ ^ ^
on the fringes of feminist theory - women of color
working olass women, - sex radicals'. The demand^
feminists begin their analysis with the lives of women
rather than academic philosophy reflects the sense that
feminist theory is yet another white, middle-class
outpost, another weapon of assimilation
. However, these
"underclass" women often imply that, as marginal group
members, they have a full awareness of the sources,
meanings, and effects of their acts that is denied to
members of hegemonic groups. They revive the logic of
Hegel's master/slave relation, but forget that the
slave's superior consciousness is yet not complete. For
the fact' of marginality does not make one an expert on
the culture, any more than hegemony does.
There is, nonetheless, much to be learned outside
the circle of theoretical dominance. In particular, one
may learn a different problematic, and different
problems. The fears of communitarian philosophers, while
not entirely misguided by any means, may be exaggerated
by their focus on the words spoken in the culture. The
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words of modern liberal culture are bereft of any
conduce in a reai good, real standards for living
,
real community. yet the actions Qf participants
more confidence than the words Thi^v, „u o . is should not surprise
us. As actual existent beings, we can no .ore suspend
belief than we can suspend breath. The density of
reality, rather than its elusiveness, is what surrounds
us. in such a world, what is needed is a history - a
genealogy, a counter-memoryl8 that opposes ^
of reality, the density of interpretation. We do not
need to prove that we exist, in the .anner of
.etaphysics
-
which is, to prove that we have the right to exist. We
do exist, we live our lives, inescapably, with existing
others. to justify this by defining, by ontologizing, by
tracing descent, is to suggest that our present existence
is open to dispute.
One of the mediocre strengths of liberalism is its
acceptance of this sense of inevitability in reality.
The world of the liberal is a world in which, as Isaiah
Berlin put it, "human goals are many, not all of them
commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one
another". 19 In this world, conflicts can be seen, at
least partially, for what they are: conflicts between
h~. A theory that would minimi2e ^^^^ ^
kn°W itS intSreSt or its true identity or
community or history, fails not so much because ^ ^
wrong as because it draws dangerous conciusions. i may
be neurotic, or deviant, or male-identified; however, a
liberal win not deprive me Qf my
because of that, nor wiil : be excommunicated.
„y
membership is a reality, more fundamental than any
justification for or against it. if my member ship is not
that of a first-class citizen, liberalism puts the onus
on my opponents rather than on myself. Metaphysics has
been put to use to justify exclusions; that does not mean
that metaphysics must be used to justify inciusion. All
that is required is the refusal to accept the exclusion.
Political Strategies
Does this mean that all lesbians (or other marginal
groups) need ask for is 'a piece of the pie'? m a
sense, yes. The pie has been baked by a particular
historical configuration of men. The inclusion of other
people will of necessity change that configuration - not
because women or non-„hlte s or workers are inherently
virtuous, out simply beC ause they are different. The
suggestion that assimilation will be total reflects
either a lack of confluence in the strength of marginal
Pecples, or an ahistorical belief in the capitalist,
male-dominated modern world, without sounding facile, I
want to suggest that strategies of entry are, at this
pcint, more directly radical than strategies of
withdrawal or revolt 20. The creatiQn ^ ^
non-hegemonic cultural resources and community are
encouraging, stimulating developments. They will be more
so as they decline to reify and discipline their
participants
.
What exactly does this mean for lesbians? Lesbians,
as members of one of the primary 'deviant' classes in
society, have attempted to counter the prevailing
stereotypes of their lives by a variety of strategies.
In the lesbian-feminist strategy, the priority is on the
creation of a community and a history that will offer the
lesbian a sense of belonging rather than exclusion,
positive identity through membership in a group that has
a culture of its own - a culture, in fact superior to
that denied them. On the other hand a 'reformist'
1 HO
"rategy has focussea on the elimination of
-d legal barriers t0 membership ^ ^^
and on the development of a sense of pride, not as
lesbians per se, but as persons who are lesbian.
The second path has been characterized by lesbian-
feminists and others as mere assimilation, the denial of
one's true self in order to participate. The two
strategies, in fact, reflect the conflict that is endemic
to modernity: given the current fact oflwl r otherness within
the self, given the consensus among theorists that
contemporary societies exact a high price for stability
and order, we are faced, as Connolly has noted, with the
choice between a vision "in which the goal is to
integrate otherness into more perfect forms of
identification with the will of a rational community" and
one which suggests that "we should strive to create more
institutional space to allow otherness to be". 21 what j
hope to have demonstrated, through examination of
lesbian-feminism as a communitarian project, is that the
first option is not available to us as we are presently
constituted: that otherness is a constant, harassing
presence which will not vanish under any political or
discursive regime in modernity, and that acceptance of
tMS fact must be the bas
* «" •** future politics . for
lesbians, for women, for heterosexual white men.
This in turn suggests that the polities of reform
^s severs! advantages. First
, it doe£ ^^ _
to define and to subjectify one's differenoe in order to
claim rights. Within the lesbian-feminist community,
-hership is baSed on standards no less restrictive than
-
the iarger society, and these standards have so far
not shown themselves to be suffirimt ,rr c ently unproblematic
that their restrictiveness should be overlooked. if
anything, this community is under more pressure to
justify its standards, because it is less diffuse and
-re intimate than the heterosexual culture surrounding
it. The comparison to medieval society is apt in this
regard. Excommunication was not simply a matter of
iosing one's political rights or one's job; it involved
the loss of the structure of one's life - friends,
Church, family, God. To the extent that lesbians form an
insular community, members face similar risks in
challenging common beliefs. In contrast, broader-based
reform movements may work without insisting that
participants adhere to a 'way of life', thus leaving
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issues of other differsnces open to ^ ^ ^
volatile level.
A second advantage is that, while reform movements
support than community strategies, they in fact raay
achieve
.ore. Specifically, mainstream efforts may
provide their actors with a strong persona! identity that
xs more resilient than that offered by alternative
comities, because it is broader based. A lesbian raay
indeed find herself capable of alliance and even
friehdship
- even community - with straight women, as
well as with men of all sorts, that will prove more
personally durable as well as politically effective. The
community of lesbian-feminists, to the extent that it
ignores the society surrounding it, runs the continual
risk of reaction and oppression by that society. it is
inconceivable that an attitude of hostility and
separation will engender anything other than itself; few
of us are in a position to make that worthwhile. This is
not a caution against any agitation. It is, rather, a
suggestion that such action must be conducted in a spirit
of goodwill and hope for common action rather than one
that suspects even potential allies. This is
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increasing being recognized fay lesblan_ feminists ^
are broadening their politics fcQ ^ ^^
of community and the need for a poi . tics ^ ^rates
beyond community boundaries.
m line with this consideration, it is worth
remembering the debate, described in Chapter Two, between
the liberal psychiatrists and their conservative and
radical opponents. The conservatives and radicals were
united in their perception that the issue of sexuality
went beyond personal choice of lifestyle. The simple
liberal denial that medical evaluations of sexual differ-
ence were relevant to social or political judgments gave
way in the face of the agreement of the major antagonists
that in fact they were. The reaction of lesbian-
feminists to this was to deny the authority of medical
discourse, using the negative images of the conservatives
as examples of the fundamental misogyny of patriarchal
society. The gay rights activists, on the other hand,
fought to change the images held by the majority of
Americans, and to remove homosexuality from the category
of pathology.
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The Withdrawal of Meaning from Difference
The history of lesbian-feminism and the inslght , fc
offers int0 the problems of liberalism may afford us an
opening into what changes are needed to make a per-
spective so basic to America as liberalism is not
Pathoiogicai to it. In particular, this history may help
us to distinguish the heart of liberalism from its
unnecessary appendages and parasitic growths, and to free
it from the misunderstandings of both defenders and
opponents
.
The final gr0Und of the question of liberalism, we
have seen, is the question of the self - how it is
constituted and how it is to be treated. The basic
question that arises from this study is whether sexuality
is inevitably so fundamental to social organization as it
has seemed, or more exactly, in what ways and for what
purposes it may have this status. While the liberals
were naive in suggesting that at present sexuality need
not be so explosive, they were perhaps pointing in the
right direction after all. As long as we agree that "it
is sex itself which hides the most secret parts of the
individual, the structure of his fantasies, the roots of
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his ego, the forms of Ms relatlonship ^ reautyii22 ^d
that we cannot live in common with different sexualities,
We will be fnrrpH +-« •h o ced to impose
'proper' sexuality on
ourselves and othpr<? a „nerS
"
As we Prepare ourselves to
question the nature and status of sexualitvy, we become
open to reevaluate the claims of otherness in our lives
It becomes possible to imagine rights as adhering, not
simply to the approved subject, but to the self as that
which encompasses both subjectivity and otherness.
This will not be mere assimilation; neither will tt
be simple liberalism. It win, however
, dra„ on ^
liberal notion of rights, and on the high valuation of
individual freedom and dignity characteristic of
liberalism
. „e can safely dispense with such ideas only
as long as we trust that our community will never arrive
at a truth that requires our subjugation; few of us can
be so secure. The way to a decent life seems to be
almost the opposite of the communitarian ideal. Rather
than find or develop the community within which security
and dignity are to be found, we need to focus our
imagination again on our differences, actual and
potential. Recognition of commonality leads to com-
passion and care, qualities sorely needed today; however,
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without a humble recognition of th* f «y e fundamental otherness
of others, we cannot do them iustirp *c hj ce as human agents.
Liberalism survived in the past by denying that Qur
differences were so fUndamentai as to present obstacles
to community. it ignored difference m„^ ^ ii , moving to the
abstract ground of a 'thin self deserving of rights.
This move has been briiii ant ly
, thoroughly oritici Z ed by
writers such as sandal, Taylor, and Maclntyre. The
solution will not come, however, from attacking the
citadel in the name of our essential embodiment or
constitution through language. Such arguments
demonstrate that the liberal self is a fiction. They do
not speak to that within us' which never quite fits the
public boundaries, which defies the explanations of
social construction. There is, indeed, no one so
pathetic as the subject who fits without trouble, without
thought, into public parameters. Such a subject is
thoroughly subjected, fit only to be ruled. The fact of
our social construction must be placed alongside the fact
that our construction values individuality as well as
community. This cannot be disposed of by appeals to a
'higher self in which individuality and community are
reconciled. The best modernity seems to offer is the
capacity to live with the tension hetween the two, the
Proper recognition of difference as well as totality
What exactly i s the proper recognition of
difference, Perhaps at this point ! can he ciearer hy
stating what it is not. Relief from the bonds Qf
-dernity will not come from the efforts of those groups
previously defined by a disciplinary discourse to
legitimate 'their' nrnnng oup. This means that groups must
resist fighting simply for 'gay right s' or 'women's
rights' or 'civil rights' for any group as a group. what
must be engaged in is a questioning of the process
whereby such groups are defined and formed. The proper
recognition of difference does not involve a simple
tolerance for 'other' groups, but requires a wholesale
reexamination of the lines of exclusion drawn in
modernity and a reevaluation of the aims and needs
expressed in these divisions. This does not imply that
all barriers to desire will be eliminated; as we saw in
Chapter Four, the sexual libertarian goal remains flawed
by its inability to deal with the facts of social power,
even as the libertarians reveal the complicity of
lesbian-feminism with the order it hopes to oppose. It
seems increasingly plausible that no desire is innate, to
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be privileged over others to hnS
'
0 be reused from examinatior
while others explain themselves To t-h* .
* he extent that
sexuality is a means of control, a channel of social
Power, all of i ts forms are equally iraplicated ^ ^
maintenance of order.
The result of this knowledge need not be a micro-
scopic examination into the details of each individual's
sexuality. A l iberal may draw the conclusion that in
fact it is precisely this that commands us to respect one
another's privacy, to refrain from confessing or
deeding confession, and to seriously reconsider demands
that we 'be' hetero- or homo-, perverted or normal,
marginal or central. We need to see what is at stake in
the categories we have made
, and to decide whether we
wish to or need to maintain those lines, is the
heterosexual family in fact the 'fundamental building
block of society'? how is that changing under
capitalism? what exactly does this imply for those who
do not find themselves in such a family - and how does
the presence of these 'others' impact on that family? i s
the centrality of the modern family threatened by the
presence of alternatives? Is that good or bad? All
these questions need serious examination. We need to
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take seriously the possibility that societies raay
survive, even thrive, with more diversity than ^
afforded us in modernity.
It is here, ironically, that the liberal co.es to
her forte. For Poucault tells us that the proble ra with
-dern political theory is not so much that it is wr^
-
th" it is irrelevant. In theory, we hear, we have
not yet "cut off the King's head". oblivious to the
passing of the age of power as force, theorists absorb
themselves in questions of sovereignty and right. 23 And
certainly, among moderns, liberals are preeminent in this
absorption. Poucault does not tell us clearly what it is
that we are to substitute for these conceptions, but his
elucidation of the power/knowledge nexus is meant to open
a new avenue that will eliminate the obfuscation that
results from asking the wrong questions.
Until that time, however, the discourse that is most
capable of challenging the disciplinary powers is that of
politics. Murray Edelman's point about the 'helping
professions' is apt: therapeutic discourse serves to
justify actions that otherwise would be protested as
tyranny24. In its focus Qn physical acts and boundarieS/
liberal political discourse serves to expose the
presumptions behlnd any language used ^ . ustify
It does, of course, carry lt. own presumptlons ^
Predispositions. The strength of liberal
hOWCTer
'
13 that
* a commitment to treat power
as power when it is revealed as such, and that its
commitment to libertv is r,ry of a sort that may be contrasted
with commitments to a common good, pride, self-
deter.ination, authentic being, or any other, without
suggesting that these things are liberty 25. It is ^
very barrenness of liberal discourse that is its
occasional strength as well as its weakness. In forcing
us to rise above the distinctions inscribed in social
practice and language, liberalism provides a ground for
challenging even those upon which it rests. The question
then is not what are we to substitute for a barren,
pernicious legacy, but rather, how can we infuse it with
life and meaning? This is the problem awaiting us.
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one another." Isaiah Berlin, "Two Concepts of Liberty",
OP- cit., p. 171.
CHAPTER SIX
DEMOCRATIC INDIVIDUALITY AND THE RENOVATION OF
LIBERALISM
Do I contradict myself?
Very well then I contradict myself,
(I am large, I contain multitudes)
.
-Walt Whitman
in treating the problems of liberalism, George Kateb
has suggested that "the renovation of liberalism" must be
based on a theory of "democratic individuality" that goes
beyond "either the Whig tradition or the theoretical
consecration of the private life of property-acquisition
within the uncitizenly safety of undemocratic rule".l
What is needed, in his view, is a foundation for
liberalism that sees the individual as basic and sacred
while acknowledging social construction and the reality
of a community beyond the level of contract. This
foundation will be neither Kantian nor utilitarian, for
neither school has a satisfactory conception of what we
are and how we are bound together. The Kantian attempts
to ground rights and justice in a soil beyond contract or
community, but she does so only by abandoning democracy
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as well. The utilitarian, on the other hand, cannot
Provide an account of individual rignts and respect ^
resxsts social expediency. What Kateb argues for is "a
developed theory of individual integrity as "the
necessary foundation of the theory of democratic
individuality.-^ Such a theory win resist the
encroachments of power, whatever its source. This
resistance begins with the detachment from existing
social conventions that is characteristic of self-
conscious creatures. Such detachment does not demand
rejection of convention, but does require the
acknowledgement that "all social conventions are, in
fact, conventions
- i.e., artificial; that they are
changeable; that conventions have in fact changed through
time, and are different from place to place. "3 Given
the fact of self-consciousness, this detachment is
essential for an honest, self-critical life; the only
alternative seems to be "justifying old inhibitions on a
new basis". 4 Detachment, Kateb says, is needed to
"defend the individual against regulation by any agency
that is starkly and publicly distinct from the
individual", but also "against regulation by any less
specifiable force that seems to permeate society and
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threatens to take in the susceptible individual" .
5
To those within the Aristotelian tradition, such
detachment bespeaks nihilism. The recognition of the
conventional nature of sori^ic al l lfe and institutions seems
to them to suggest that no order is to hou l 0 be preferred over
any other. The insistence of liberals that they are not
bound to a teleology reinforces this suspicion. However,
it appears that both liberals and their critics are
mistaken as to the nature of liberalism Th» „^widusm. r e concern for
detachment and the recognition of convention are
themselves rooted in a conception of human telos that is
grounded in the capacity for rational choice. Such a
telos requires that we be able to distinguish what is
essential to life, what is 'natural', from what is open
to debate and judgment. This distinction does not imply
that all convention is equal, or inaccessible to reasoned
discussion, m fact, such discussion can only be rooted
in the recognition that some things are conventional.
This capacity to abstract from our circumstances is in
fact the fundamental condition of philosophy.
Such abstraction, however, must not be confused with
the isolation of the self in a cloister of truth.
Resistance to the encroachments of power does not imply
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withdrawal from society
. Liberals ^^ ^
-volves power relations, and they accept that fact
without becking cynical or nihilistic. The position of
the cynic is, as always, but the protected face of
disappoints, only by involving oneself in public life
on every level can one hope to prevent abuse and
usurpation. The practice of critical detachment is not
the hysterical separation, the denial of connection, that
is so prevalent in contemporary America; it is in fact
based upon, and consists in, an understanding of both the
solidity and importance of human connection and its
dangers
.
From this, we can see that the creation of
individuality is not a mere matter of possessive
individualism, nor of "domestic privatism". The claims
of individuality may work against acquisitiveness as well
as against friendship, when those become opposed to/ my
ability to live a life of integrity. The self that is to
be nurtured is not simply given, placed in a social
setting, but is also able to, indeed must, transcend the
barriers of the given. As such, it will include elements
of the 'Other', of the weak and despised as well as the
valued. A liberalism built on this foundation will be
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grounded on empathy as well as nn,Hn prudence, compassion as
well as contract.
Kateb cautions, however f^f .., that empathy cannot
abolish distance
, only^ it _„ 6 ^ ^ ac^t ^
statement, we must be wa ry of any poUtioal theory that
proposes to base it-o0 i fS l SSl to ° exclusively on empathy.
While we clearly need * Qr^0 *Y a space for empathy, this space
cannot be the only arena for politics A, aur nes. s n enterprise
conducted among adversaries and competitors as well as
friends and partners, a viable politics requires that we
engage both in locating our commonalities and in
providing for our differences. Small or exclusive
communities are necessary for the provision of roots and
security; these must be nurtured and strengthened in the
face of their erosion and the increasing
bureaucratization of public life. However, the present
historical configuration of the nation-state will not
evaporate in the foreseeable future, and we need to work
for more equitable relations within that configuration
even as we nurture local community. These larger
relations cannot be built on empathy, but must find their
ground in understandings and respect that recognize our
differences as well as our commonalities. Attacks on the
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based in empathy or compassion. They are attacks ^
Politics as an enterprise conducted by humans who are
separated and suspicious of one another as well as
connected. Liberal notions Qf ^ ^ ^
conceptions of governraent as an arrangement for the
accomplishment of Umited ends, are denigrated by male
communitarians as unrealistic and destructive, and by
-ny feminists as reflective of a masculine reality which
-
pathologically oriented toward denial of connection 7
What all of these criticisms share is the implication
that our lives should be seamless wholes, where we can
move from 'private' to 'public' and bac* again with the
same goals, same expectations, same selves in each
setting. This assumption must be seriously re-evaluated
before liberal (or non-liberal) theory can progress.
The communitarian argument rests on the belief that
by dispensing with the elements that blind or distort our
vision, we will reach agreement on the questions facing
us; it is based on what Connolly calls an 'ontology of
concord'. 8 what has not been forthcoming, Don Herzog has
written, is "an account of what commitments should bind
us, what content the communal attachments that should
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transcend our individual proj ects should have, what
exactly the common good should be" 9 ln f^ „ract, he argues,
the charge of
'incompleteness' i s perhaos m nJ-& n p ore accurately
directed against liberalism's critics wh. W en we actually
get down to substantive ideaXs and goals
, communitarians
splinter, when they do not abandon the fieid altogether.
As we saw, lesbian-feminists and conservative
psychiatrists have shared a critigue of liberalism while
maintaining opposite positions on the substantive issue
before them. Such disputes are a constant of social
life. The liberal position is precisely an attempt to
discover what we can and must agree upon; accepting that
most issues are not amenable to settled agreement among
all members of society, adhering to a 'philosophy of
dissonance', liberal <? t-™ i
,
x u is ry to lay a ground for safe,
dignified coexistence. 10
H.N. Hirsch has said that "the problem of
contemporary liberalism is not the absence of community,
but rather the manner in which liberalism defines the
mature, 'deserving' self, and, by so doing, distributes
the fundamental rights of citizens. "11 Thus
, he argues
that
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be ten af ^ ng Ti TT ^
understanding of the "unity" oAT fl?-d)although they define the essence f tw 'in different terms ^ en o that self
ive, both UberarindividuaUsHnd 3 P6rSPSCt -
communitarianism might be viewed as ™ ,mentary modes of Ji„ ^ l comple-
in both cases, the t" y amh
1PUne
'
betraVing,
nature of the self. 12
V bl9u°«s and anarchic
From this perspective, the antidote to a sterile
liberalism is not a community that can mediate between
self and other in a more satisfying way, or one that will
embody the teles of the individual, but a reformulation
of the self that is granted respect and membership in the
community. This reformulation will have the specific
form of a loosening of claims from a metaphysical
hierarchy of personal attributes- i i v,Li D c , it will be grounded on
an appreciation of differences that cannot, will not be
named or categorized. The problem with liberalism is not
that it is insufficient, but that it fails to go far
enough; it betrays its fundamental insight of irreducible
plurality by reducing that plurality to a list of
possible axes of differentiation and deciding which axes
are deserving of public recognition. In their guest for
a deeper community, American opponents of liberalism have
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too often sought to reformats or rehierarchize the
a*es. Real change, however, requires questioning the
f°r
' ^ ™^ate arenas of, such differenti-
ation. By calling attention to the funda.ental status of
the co«„i to heterosexuality, lesbian-fe.inists brought
to light one of these axes. The worx before us, now, is
to question the nature and necessity of the hetero/ homo
axis in its entirety. Anythlng less wiu ^ ^ ^
justice to the true extent and depth of our
multiplicities
.
The liberal polity represents a determined effort to
find a common ground that nonetheless supports the claims
of the individual against the community. To the extent
that it has shown itself to be susceptible to capture or
exploitation by non-political powers, it must be
challenged to change. To eliminate it in favor of a
tighter, more authentic regime, however, is to deliver us
over entirely to those powers, be they economic,
religious, medical, or any other. The twin facts of
plurality and power mandate that we acknowledge the
limited, controversial nature of any process or policy,
even as we seek to defend it. We must develop
conceptions of society and economy that do not rely on
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the notion of an essential, authentic self for their
critical force, and yet provide a ground for opposing
impositions and systematic inequalities. Lesbian-
feminism's strength has lain in its ability to expose
deep structures such as compulsory heterosexuality
,
thereby reminding us that constructions of self are in
fact constructions. Its continuing struggle is to
maintain and develop these insights without retreating
into essentialism or facile explanations of enduring
differences. The need for an identity rooted in a
community and a history is real; so also is the need to
self-consciously transcend that community in order to
complete identity. Individuality must be tied to, and
transcend, community if it is to be vital and meaningful.
It is to this difficult, central human dilemma that
political theory and organization addresses itself. We
can be faithful to our existence only if we acknowledge
its endurance beyond any politics.
The final issue for theorists now, is no longer the
content of theories - it is the activity of theorizing
itself, the foundation of theory in certain forms of
discourse. The shift of modernity is partly a product
of, and partly due to, the shift in philosophy from
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ontology to epistemology . 13 This qh ~.yy in s ift provided a new
agenda for political theory in t-W -v,, l hat theories' groundwork
could now lie lpc<? r,r.ess on the answer to the question 'what is
the right order?' and more on that m t-v,n to the question 'what
can TC know about the right order?' Liberalism's
rejection or earlier teleology i s based in lts minimal
answer to the latter question, just as Aristotle deals
with the former. The fact of the primacy of epistemology
leaves any return to teleology open to the Nietzschean
dismissal
- as long as the epistemological question is
treated rationalistically, as the definitive question,
and one that must be answered in universal terms. To the
rationalistic mind, the denial either that the
epistemological issue is primary or that an acceptable
answer be universal is tantamount to nihilism, without
transcendental standards, it is feared, we will be left
with nothing but naked power. By this time, however,
Foucault has made us painfully aware that, in modernity,
power moves precisely through such transcendental
standards. 14 The question for us now is whether the
attempt at universals is doomed, or whether there may be
a way to frame some standards of morality and justice in
such a manner as to increase both self-understanding and
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~ty. Some such project/ of a
dear, is essential if we are to make any progress as
Political thinners and actors. A change in attitude
towards greater recognition of reality - of the humanity
-nifest in individuals, beyond statistics and categories
-
with a corresponding movement in theorizing from a
'scientific' to a
'conversational' mode - these are the
avenues to new and fruitful theory.
Michael Oakeshott distinguishes between conceptions
of human intercourse as inquiry and as conversation thus:
In a conversation the participants are not
"ru
a
t
g
h? to be d^^^ °r 3 dGbate; the- 1* -tru iscovered, no proposition to beproved, no conclusion sought. They are notconcerned to inform, to persuade, or to refuteone another and therefore the cogency of theirutterances does not depend upon their allspeaking in the same idiom; they may differwithout disagreeing... m conversation, 'facts'appear only to be resolved once more into thepossibilities from which they were made;
certainties' are shown to be combustible, notby being brought in contact with other
'certainties' or with doubts, but by beingkindled by the presence of ideas of another
order; approximations are revealed between
notions normally remote from one another. 15
In conversations there are many voices, some recog-
nizable from experience, others seemingly new and
strange. However, all are to be treated equally and
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respected for what thev ar-P- *y e
-
indeed, conversation
"is
lmpossible in the ab
— - * diversity of voices: in itCerent unlverses of discourse^ ^
other and enjoy an oblique reXationship which neither
requires nor forer^t-o u •r casts their being assimilated to one
another ."16
This idea, however, is constantly imperiled:
"For
each voice is prone to ^p^, that is
, an exclusive
concern with its own utterance, which may result in its
identifying the conversation with itself and its speaking
as if it were speaking only to itself. And when this
happens, barbarism may be observed to have supervened. "17
The barbarism of modernity lies in the domination of
human conversation by two voices: that of 'science' and
that of practical activity. Under their sway, the
conversation has degenerated into a pair of monologues,
interrupted by occasional squabbles over territory. The
prime piece of turf, of course, is politics. For
whatever may be said about the various sources of meaning
in our lives, politics is a constant. However, the
nature of politics, its relevance and its forms, are
conceived in several ways, each with their characteristic
evaluation of that conceived activity.
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Conceptions of politics have been a problem
Particular for Orleans, whose natural law heritage
leaves us so suspicious of compromise, of decisions made
on a level other than
'principle-. Politics is for us a
mUrkY
' ^ bUSl— - - lahel someone or southing
'Political' is t0 place it in dlrect ^^^^ ^
ideal of truth or justice that is so potent in the United
States. The slogan that 'the personal is political' does
not mean simply that our private lives are informed by
Public understandings, nor that they involve negotiation
and compromise; its tone is one of accusation, of
exposure. Must that always be the case? There is
insight in the slogan and in the awareness that generated
it which we must acknowledge and accept. However, when
Placed in the content of American confusion over the
nature of politics and the political, the slogan - and
the awareness
- may be seen to be fundamentally
disruptive of the possibility of that conversation so
essential for our human survival and development. The
cautions of Maclntyre sound extreme and in some sense
misguided in the safe halls of academe. But his
portrayal, as well as his predictions, are altogether
plausible if we do not break out of the nihilistic trap
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laid for us by rationalism Sciphoo
'
b ence
' powerful as it is,
will not arrive at the 'truth' uof humans and their
it is the only alternative to arbitrary power. Our huraan
conversation must expand to introduce all the voices that
inform our lives. Feminist scholarship has begun this
expansion by its integration of scientific analysis,
historical exploration, philosophical engagement, and
literary awareness of the positions and experiences of
women in society. It too, however, has often shut the
doors against 'suspect knowledges' - those discourses
such as psychiatry and psychoanalysis that earlier lent
themselves to the destruction of the self-respect of many
women. One of the challenges for us now is to re-examine
those disciplines and discourses, and to note especially
when they provide unwelcome or unintegrated insights.
The discovery of a conversational mode will allow us to
explore alternative explanations and understandings of
our lives without breaking a commitment to psychic and
intellectual coherence. Such a project is difficult to
describe, and more difficult to engage in. But it must
not be regarded as impossible. For the price of failure
to enlist in this adventure is the continuance of tired
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disputes, both a.ong politlcal theorists
m pursuing a conversational raode
, ootn groups should
fxnd new sources of the energy and understanding that are
so desperately needed if we are to survive and live well
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